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AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board: The Supreme Court
Recognizes Broad FCC Jurisdiction over Local Telephone
Competition
Less than twenty years after the break up of the Bell System
brought competition to long-distance markets,' Congress acted to
promote local telephone competition by enacting the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.2 The Act thus far has produced at
least as much competition in the courtroom as it has in the
marketplace. With $100 billion of annual revenue from local
exchange service at stake,4 incumbent local exchange carriers
1. See United States v. AT&T Co. ("Consent Decree"), 552 F. Supp. 131, 226-27
(D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). For a
clear, concise overview of the rationale behind the break up of the Bell System, see Glen
0. Robinson, The Titanic Remembered AT&T and the Changing World of
Telecommunications, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 517, 531-32 (1988) (book review).
2. Pub. L. No. 104-104,110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 47 U.S.C.). See generally Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of
1996,49 FED. COMM. LJ. 1, 4-49 (1996) (discussing the motivations behind the 1996 Act,
summarizing its principal features, and offering a preliminary evaluation of its strengths
and weaknesses). The heart of the Act is its effort to promote competition in local
telephone service. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 857 (1997) (stating that the effort to
promote local telephone competition was one of the "major components" of the 1996
Act); Glen 0. Robinson, The "New" Communications Act: A Second Opinion, 29 CONN.
L. REV. 289, 304 (1996) ("[N]ext to [the telephone competition provisions,] all other parts
of the Act pale in importance.").
3. The Wall Street Journal aptly summarized the Act's practical impact in 1997:
"Instead of invading one another's phone, video, and other communications markets,
potential rivals have squared off in scores of lawsuits filed in state and federal courts
across the country." Bryan Gruley et al., SBC Files Challenge to Telecom Law, WALL ST.
J., July 3, 1997, at A3. The Senate has taken legislative notice of the lack of progress in the
opening of local markets. On July 1, 1999, Senator Hollings introduced the
Telecommunications Competition Enforcement Act of 1999. See S. 1312, 106th Cong.
(Sup. Docs. No. Y1.4/1:106-1312)). The bill includes the finding that ILECs "do not have
adequate incentives to cooperate in [the opening of local telephone markets to
competition] and that regulators have not exercised their enforcement authority to require
compliance [with the 1996 Act]." Id. § 2(5). The bill would increase ILECs' incentives for
cooperation by imposing financial penalties on companies that have not complied fully
with their duties under the 1996 Act. See id. § 4. The FCC would have full authority to
implement and enforce the bill's requirements. See id. For further discussion of ILECs,
see infra note 5.
4. See HENK BRANDS & EvAN T. LEO, THE LAW AND REGULATION OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS CARREERS 10 (1999) (stating that local exchange carriers
generate roughly half of the $220 billion in annual revenues produced by the
telecommunications industry).
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(ILECs)5 and competing local exchange carriers (CLECs) 6 have had
ample incentive to litigate over the content of the rules governing
local competition.7 A second battleground has been the more basic
question of who gets to make these rules. State utility commissions
have squared off against the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC or "the Commission") over the scope of federal jurisdiction
under the 1996 Act,8 thereby continuing a long history of disputes
over the proper contours of "telecommunications federalism."9
Sweeping aside a sixty-year tradition of state control over intrastate
communications, the Supreme Court resolved the jurisdictional issue
in 1999 by recognizing broad FCC jurisdiction over local telephone
competition in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board."
This Note begins by briefly describing the telecommunications
regime established by the judicially supervised breakup of the Bell
System" and the changes in that regime effected by the 1996 Act. 2
Next, the Note reviews the procedural history of AT&T3 and
summarizes the Court's decision and the arguments advanced in two
partial dissents. 4 The Note then briefly reviews the history of
telecommunications federalism prior to the 1996 Act.1 Next, the
Note analyzes the jurisdictional issues in AT&T, 6 arguing that
5. The Act defines an ILEC as a provider of local telephone exchange service that
was a member of the exchange carrier association described in 47 C.F.R. § 69.601 (current
version at 47 C.F.R. § 69.601 (1999)) at the time of the Act's passage. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 251(h)(1) (Supp. II 1997). The principal ILECs are traditional providers of local
telephone service, such as GTE and the regional Bell operating companies created by the
break up of the Bell System. See BRANDS & LEO, supra note 4, at 11.
6. A CLEC is any carrier who competes with any ILEC to provide local telephone
service. See BRANDS & LEO, supra note 4, at 696. Most CLECs are small, although major
long-distance carriers such as AT&T and MCI can become CLECs by offering local
telephone service. See John T. Soma et al., The Essential Facilities Doctrine in the
Deregulated Telecommunications Industry, 13 BERKELEY TEcH. L.J. 565, 608 (1998)
(noting that major long-distance carriers can take advantage of the Act's interconnection,
unbundling, and resale requirements to provide local telephone service).
7. Most of the rules governing local competition initially were released in
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of
1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499 (1996) [hereinafter First Report &
Order]. The local competition rules are codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 51.1-.809 (1999).
8. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753,792 (8th Cir. 1997), affd in part, rev'd in
part sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
9. BRANDS & LEO, supra note 4, at 39.
10. 525 U.S. 366,378 (1999).
11. See infra notes 22-32 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 33-48 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 57-94 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 95-127 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 128-326 and accompanying text.
1646 [Vol. 78
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996
legislative history,17 the plain language of the statute, 8 and the
application of "tie-breaking" interpretive principles 9 do not compel
the result reached by the majority. Finally, the Note discusses policy
considerations that support, and may partially explain, the Court's
decision. °  The Note concludes by suggesting some troubling
implications of the Court's attempt to interpret a systematically
ambiguous statute on purely textual grounds.2'
Many of the local telephone companies involved in AT&T were
created by the break up of the Bell System in the early 1980s. Under
the 1982 consent decree between the Justice Department and
AT&T,2 the corporation had to divest itself of its local telephone
subsidiaries (the "regional Bell operating companies" or "regional
Bells") because they functioned as "bottlenecks" that allowed AT&T
to control its long distance competitors' access to customersA' The
decree also restricted the regional Bells' lines of business,24 barring
them from competing in the long-distance market because their
control of local telephone networks would have given them an unfair
advantage over other long distance competitors. I
The consent decree further promoted long-distance competition
by requiring the regional Bells to provide interconnection to
competing long-distance providers on terms equal to those provided
to AT&T, but did not force local exchange carriers to interconnect
with potential competitors in the local market.26 As a concession to
17. See infra notes 128-50 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 151-239 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 240-304 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 305-26 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 327-32 and accompanying text.
22. The terms of the 1982 consent decree are set forth in United States v. AT&T Co.
("Consent Decree"), 552 F. Supp. 131, 226-27 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom. Maryland v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
23. See Robert B. Friedrich, Regulatory and Antitrust Implications of Emerging
Competition in Local Access Telecommunications: How Congress and the FCC Can
Encourage Competition and Technological Progress in Telecommunications, 80 CORNELL
L. REV. 646, 659 (1995). Each of the seven regional Bells that emerged from the break up
of the Bell System retained monopoly control over several zones known as "exchange
areas" or "local access and transport areas," which unified regions with common social
and economic characteristics. See Consent Decree, 552 F. Supp. at 141. Under the consent
decree's regime, local exchange carriers handled all traffic within exchange areas while
long-distance carriers handled traffic between exchange areas. See id.
24. See Consent Decree, 552 F. Supp. at 186-95.
25. See id. at 188-89. U.S. District Court Judge Greene modified the consent decree
to stipulate that the line-of-business restrictions could be waived if the regional Bells
showed that there was no "substantial possibility" that they could abuse their monopoly
over the local exchanges. Id. at 195.
26. See First Report & Order, supra note 7, 10, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15,508 (stating that
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economic realities, the consent decree allowed the newly independent
regional Bells and other local exchange carriers to maintain state-
regulated monopoly control over local telephone service.27 Although
genuine competition seemed possible in the long-distance market, the
local exchange was thought to be a "natural monopoly" and, thus,
impervious to government interventions designed to promote
competition8 The absence of interconnection duties stifled
competition because without government intervention, established
phone companies had no economic incentive to cooperate with
competitors.29 Potential competitors stayed out of the local exchange
market, reasoning that retail customers would not want to sign up for
local service with small start-ups that could connect them with only a
few thousand other local subscribers when they could sign up with
ILECs that could provide access to hundreds of thousands of
subscribers?
In the years following the consent decree, however, technological
developments made competition in local markets seem possible.31
Early governmental efforts to promote such competition were
prior to the 1996 Act, ILECs could discourage local competition by refusing to
interconnect with market entrants); Duane McLaughlin, Note, FCC Jurisdiction over
Local Telephone Under the 1996 Act: Fenced Off?, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2210,2222 (1997)
(noting that "incumbent providers were under no duty to connect with prospective
competitors" before the 1996 Act).
27. See Friedrich, supra note 23, at 658.
28. See Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulating Telecommunications, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 25,
29 (1995). A natural monopoly exists when the market for some good or service can be
served more efficiently by a single, large firm than by multiple, smaller firms. See
WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TOWARD COMPETITION IN LOCAL
TELEPHONY 120 (1994). Attempting to spur competition in areas that are naturally
monopolistic is futile because economies of scale or scope inevitably give larger firms a
competitive advantage. See id. at 120-21.
29. See First Report & Order, supra note 7, 55, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15,528 (stating that
because ILECs surrender a competitive advantage by interconnecting with CLECs,
standard economic incentives will not move them to do so).
30. Without interconnection, CLEC customers can communicate only with other
CLEC customers. See BRANDS & LEO, supra note 4, at 20. Because the value of
telephone service increases with the size of the population one can reach, a CLEC cannot
offer its customers competitive value without the ability to interconnect with ILECs' vastly
larger subscriber bases. See id.
31. Those developments include cable, cellular service, expanded fiber optics, and
satellites. See Elizabeth A. Nowicki, Competition in the Local Telecommunications
Market: Legislate or Litigate?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 358 (1996); see also JOHN R.
MEYER ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF COMPETITION IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INDUSTRY 185-92 (1980) (predicting that local competition would develop because of
technologies enabling market entrants to connect subscribers to telephone networks
without relying on the house-to-house wires currently employed by ILECs); Spulber,
supra note 28, at 34-45 (arguing that the line-of-business restrictions should be lifted
because local telephone networks are no longer a natural monopoly).
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ineffective, 32 so Congress adopted the Telecommunications Act of
1996 "[tro promote competition and reduce regulation in order to
secure lower prices and higher quality services for American
telecommunications consumers and [to] encourage the rapid
deployment of new telecommunications technologies. 33 The 1996
Act promotes local competition by: (1) requiring ILECs to share
their networks with competitors;34 (2) establishing procedures for the
negotiation, arbitration, and approval of interconnection
agreements;35 and (3) authorizing the FCC to preempt state
regulations that function as barriers to market entry.36 The Act also
provides a significant incentive for the regional Bells to cooperate by
allowing them to enter long distance competition to the extent that
they open local markets to outside competitors 7
32. For example, the FCC required local phone companies to interconnect with
competitors in the early 1990s, but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit struck down the regulations as exceeding the agency's authority. See Bell Atlantic
Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441, 1447 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Some states enacted local
competition initiatives, including interconnection requirements, but these efforts also were
largely ineffective. See McLaughlin, supra note 26, at 2223 & n.78.
33. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,110 Stat. 56, 56.
34. See 47 U.S.C. § 251 (Supp. H 1997). ILECs are required to interconnect their
networks with those of competitors on "just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory" terms.
Id. § 251(c)(2)(D). In addition, ILECs must provide CLECs with access to unbundled
network elements on "just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory" terms. Id. § 251(c)(3). In
the context of the 1996 Act, the purpose of unbundled access is to enable a CLEC to lease
only those elements it needs to provide its own customers with a complete package of
telecommunications services. See First Report & Order, supra note 7, 231, 11 F.C.C.R.
at 15,617-18. In other words, ILECs may not make the provision of element X conditional
on a CLEC's purchasing element Y. See id. ILECs also must offer integrated telephone
services to CLECs "at wholesale rates" for resale to retail customers. 47 U.S.C.
§ 251(c)(4)(A). The Act, then, provides CLECs three different routes of access to an
incumbent's network-interconnection, unbundled access, and resale-that may be used
exclusively or in combination with one another. See First Report & Order, supra note 7,
12,11 F.C.C.R. at 15,509.
35. See 47 U.S.C. § 252.
36. See id. § 253(d).
37. See id. § 271(c). Regional Bells must offer interconnection and access to their
local networks in accordance with a 14-point "competitive checklist" set forth in
§ 271(c)(2)(B). In late 1999, the FCC determined for the first time that a regional Bell had
satisfied the checklist and approved Bell Atlantic's application to offer long-distance
service in New York. See Peter S. Goodman, Bell Atlantic Cleared on Long-Distance;
FCC Lets Firm Offer Service in N.Y., WASH. POST, Dec. 23,1999, at El.
Congress may have reasoned that the regional Bells would resist local competition
vigorously unless given incentives for cooperation. See Hearing on Telecomms. Policy
Reform Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 104th Cong. 72
(1995) (Sup. Does. No. Y4.C737:S.HRG.104-218) (statement of Anne K. Bingaman,
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice) ("You have to
make [the regional Bells] want something because they have it in their power to litigate
forever."). Legislative reports, bills, hearings, and excerpts from the Congressional Record
2000] 1649
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Both the FCC and state regulators have important roles to play
in the Act's implementation.38 The FCC's primary responsibility is to
promulgate rules establishing minimum national standards to govern
the interconnection process,39 while the state utility commissions are
charged with both approving privately negotiated agreements
between ILECs and CLECs and conducting mandatory arbitration
when negotiations break down.40 State commissions must insure that
arbitrated agreements meet the requirements for interconnection set
out in 47 U.S.C. § 251 and in the FCC's implementing regulations; the
commissions also are directed to set prices according to standards in
§ 252(d).4' In many respects, the states are the key actors in
promoting local competition on the ground because without state
approval of interconnection agreements, no meaningful local
connection can develop. Perhaps recognizing that a lack of state
cooperation could thwart the Act's goals, Congress directed the FCC
to step in if the states fail to carry out their duties and authorized the
relating to the 1996 Act are collected in FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 (Bernard D.
Reams, Jr. & William H. Manz eds., 1997).
38. Professor Weiser characterizes the Act as a form of "cooperative federalism," in
which federal and state agencies cooperate in the interpretation and implementation of
federal law. See Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and
Telecommunications Reform, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3 n.6, 13-14 (1999).
39. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(1) (directing the FCC to establish regulations
implementing the interconnection requirements in § 251(a)-(c)); infra note 48 (quoting
parts of § 251). Note, however, that the scope of this rulemaking authority remained
unclear until the Supreme Court's decision in AT&T.
40. See 47 U.S.C. § 252(b), (e)(1); S. REP. No. 104-23, at 15 (1995) (Sup. Docs. No.
Y1.1/5:104-23) ("[Tihe FCC will establish the national minimum standards for opening
local telephone networks and other competitive requirements. The States are then
responsible for administering, implementing[,j and resolving disputes as
telecommunications carriers meet these obligations.").
When a CLEC requests access to an incumbent's network, the Act allows the
parties to negotiate a private agreement without regard to the interconnection duties
imposed by § 251(b) and (c). See 47 U.S.C. § 252(a)(1). Should negotiations fail-as they
generally do, see GTE S., Inc. v. Morrison, 199 F.3d 733, 737 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that
"it is hard to see" how negotiations between ILECs and CLECs could succeed)-either
party can petition the state utility commission to arbitrate unresolved issues. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 252(b)(1). In effect, the Act recognizes that ILECs have insufficient incentives to
negotiate because CLECs have "little or nothing the [ILECs] needj or wantfl." First
Report & Order, supra note 7, 15, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15,510. Accordingly, the Act uses the
compulsory arbitration process to force ILECs to the bargaining table. The arbitration
process also may serve to encourage privately negotiated agreements; ILECs understand
that "if negotiation goes to arbitration then the arbitrated result will reflect costs, not
asymmetric bargaining power." Joseph Farrell, Creating Local Competition, Speech at
the Federal Communications Commission (May 15, 1996), in BRANDS & LEO, supra note
4, at 371, 375.
41. See 47 U.S.C. § 252(c)(1), (c)(2); infra note 49 (quoting § 252).
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Commission to preempt anti-competitive state regulations.42
The FCC issued its First Report and Order implementing the
Act's local telephone competition provisions in August 1996.41 In this
mammoth document,' the FCC promulgated detailed rules governing
the interpretation of 47 U.S.C. §§ 251 and 252. 45 Most notably, the
First Report and Order directed the states to use a specific pricing
methodology in establishing the rates that ILECs could charge
competitors for interconnection and unbundled access to network
elements. 6 This methodology, known as total element long-run
incremental cost (TELRIC), required that rates be based on what it
would cost an efficient carrier to produce a given network element
using the most efficient technologies currently available, rather than
on the actual, historical costs incurred by ILECs in providing that
network element.47 The FCC claimed authority to issue its TELRIC
42. See id. §§ 252(e)(5), 253(d). Section 253 states that no state law or regulation
"may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting" any carrier from providing any
telecommunications service. Id. § 253(a). If the FCC determines after public notice and
comment that a state law effectively prohibits market entry, it must preempt the law to the
extent necessary to remove the barrier to entry. See id. § 253(d). The FCC may not
preempt competitively neutral state regulations that are designed to promote or protect
universal telephone service, public safety and welfare, or consumer rights. See id.
§ 253(b).
43. First Report & Order, supra note 7,11 F.C.C.R. 15,499.
44. The First Report and Order is more than 700 pages in length (including
appendices) and was produced after review of more than 17,000 pages of public
comments. See Opening Brief for the Federal Petitioners at 8, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils.
Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999) (No. 97-831).
45. Nearly all of the First Report and Order concerns §§ 251 and 252. The text of the
FCC's regulations implementing these sections is found in Appendix B of the Order. See
First Report & Order, supra note 7, app. B, 11 F.C.C.R. at 16,191-236 (codified at 47
C.F.R. §§ 51.1-.809 (1999)).
46. See id. 618-740, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15,812-72 (explaining the FCC's proposed
pricing methodology for interconnection and unbundled access to network elements). The
rules establishing the pricing methodology are codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 51.501-.515.
47. See Paul W. Garnett, Forward-Looking Costing Methodologies and the Supreme
Court's Takings Jurisprudence, 7 COMMLAw CONSPECrUS 119, 130-31 (1999). The basic
idea behind TELRIC is that if an ILEC decides to add to its network in order to provide a
given unit of additional services, the ILEC's costs in providing that unit using today's most
efficient technologies will be much lower than the costs it would have incurred in
providing the same unit of services in the past. See BRANDS & LEO, supra note 4, at 395
(citing First Report & Order, supra note 7, 620, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15,813). From this point
of view, basing charges for interconnection and unbundled access on the ILECs' historical
costs would put competitors at a disadvantage. See id. (citing First Report & Order, supra
note 7, 679,11 F.C.C.R. at 15,846-47).
TELRIC has prompted intense scholarly debate over whether it will promote
competition and whether rates set using the methodology constitute an unconstitutional
"taking" of ILEC property under the Fifth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. V
(prohibiting the taking of "private property ... without just compensation"). Compare J.
Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory
2000] 1651
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rules based on § 251, which mandated that ILECs charge "just,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory" prices for certain services and
that the FCC "establish regulations to implement the requirements of
[§ 251]" within six months of the Act's passage. 48
ILECs and state utility commissions immediately challenged the
Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 851, 878-79 (1996) (arguing that TELRIC pricing is an
unconstitutional taking and that it violates the "regulatory contract" between ILECs and
the states), and J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, The Tragedy of the Telecommons:
Government Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements Under the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1081, 1147-52 (1997) (arguing that TELRIC pricing is
inefficient and will discourage facilities-based competition), with William J. Baumol &
Thomas W. Merrill, Deregulatory Takings, Breach of the Regulatory Contract, and the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 1037, 1039 (1997) (arguing that
TELRIC pricing is consistent with economic principles of efficient pricing and is not
precluded by either the Takings Clause or any "regulatory contract"), and Garnett, supra,
at 120 (arguing that the TELRIC methodology does not constitute an unconstitutional
taking, but that TELRIC might constitute such a taking as applied to a particular carrier if
the resulting rates jeopardized the financial integrity of that carrier). Petitioning ILECs
also have argued that TELRIC pricing is inconsistent with the language of 47 U.S.C.
§ 252(d)(1)(A)(i), which directs state commissions to establish rates for interconnection
and unbundled access "based on the cost ... of providing the interconnection or network
element." 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1)(A)(i); see Brief for Petitioners Regional Bell Companies
and GTE at 31-35, Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC (8th Cir. 1999) (No. 96-3321), available at
<http:/ls.wustl.edu/8th.cir/FCC11157472.PDF>. The Supreme Court did not reach these
issues, but they will be addressed in the AT&T remand currently pending in the Eighth
Circuit. See id. at 26-60.
48. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3), (d)(1); see also First Report & Order, supra note 7, 1 115-
17, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,559-60 (explaining the FCC's reasoning regarding its jurisdiction).
Section 251 provides:
(c) Additional obligations of incumbent local exchange carriers.
In addition to the duties contained in subsection (b), each incumbent local
exchange carrier has the following duties:
i2i Interconnection.
The duty to provide, for the facilities and equipment of any requesting
telecommunications carrier, interconnection with the local exchange
carrier's network-
iD) on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory ....
(3) Unbundled access.
The duty to provide, to any requesting telecommunications carrier for the
provision of a telecommunications service, nondiscriminatory access to
network elements on an unbundled basis ... on rates, terms, and conditions
that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory ....
(d) Implementation.
(1) In general.
Within 6 months after February 8, 1996, the Commission shall complete all
actions necessary to establish regulations to implement the requirements of
this section.
47 U.S.C. § 251(c)-(d).
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FCC's authority to mandate TELRIC pricing in several circuit courts
of appeals, arguing that § 252 authorized the state commissions to
"establish any rates for interconnection, services, or network
elements" in accordance with that section's provisions.49 A phalanx
of carriers seeking access to the local exchange market-ranging in
size from small CLECs to giant long-distance carriers like AT&T and
MCI-intervened on behalf of the FCC ° The panel on multi-district
litigation consolidated the various FCC challenges and assigned them
to the Eighth Circuit.5 After entering an initial stay,52 the Eighth
Circuit held that the FCC lacked jurisdiction to issue its TELRIC
rules53 as well as several other regulations 4 The Supreme Court
49. 47 U.S.C. § 252(c)(2); see also AT&T, 525 U.S. at 383-85 (explaining the state
commissions' challenge). Section 252 states:
(c) Standards for arbitration.
In resolving by arbitration under subsection (b) of this section any open issues
and imposing conditions upon the parties to the agreement, a State commission
shall-
(1) ensure that such resolution and conditions meet the requirements of
section 251 of this title, including the regulations prescribed by the
Commission pursuant to section 251 of this title;
(2) establish any rates for interconnection, services, or network elements
according to subsection (d) of this section....
(d) Pricing standards
(1) Interconnection and network element charges.
Determinations by a State commission of the just and reasonable rate for the
interconnection of facilities and equipment for purposes of subsection (c)(2)
of section 251 of this title, and the just and reasonable rate for network
elements for purposes of subsection (c)(3) of such section-
(A) shall be-
(i) based on the cost (determined without reference to a rate-of-
return or other rate-based proceeding) of providing the
interconnection or network element (whichever is applicable), and
(ii) nondiscriminatory, and
(B) may include a reasonable profit.
47 U.S.C. § 252(c)-(d).
50. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 109 F.3d 418, 418-20 (8th Cir. 1996) (listing the
parties), motion to vacate denied, 519 U.S. 978 (1996).
51. See id. at 421 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a)(3) (1994) (describing the procedure by
which the panel on multi-district litigation consolidates petitions for review of certain
agency orders and assigns them to a single court of appeals by random selection)).
Federal appellate courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all final orders issued by the FCC.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) (1994).
52. See Iowa Utils. Bd., 109 F.3d at 421 (granting a stay of the FCC's pricing rules and
its "pick and choose" rule).
53. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 800 (8th Cir. 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
54. See id. at 802-06 (invalidating several FCC regulations on jurisdictional grounds);
infra notes 72, 157 (discussing the non-pricing jurisdictional issues in the case). The court
also ruled on substantive challenges to several of the FCC's regulations. See Iowa Utils.
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granted certiorari and consolidated the appeals with those from
another case55 under the name AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board.6
In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court reversed the
Eighth Circuit's jurisdictional holdings, recognizing broad FCC
jurisdiction over the Act's local telephone competition provisions. 7
Most importantly, the Court held that the FCC has the authority to
design a pricing methodology for use by the state commissions in
arbitrating interconnection agreements5 The Court also reviewed
several FCC rules on the merits,59 upholding all but one.60  Chief
Bd., 120 F.3d at 800-01, 806-19; supra notes 59-60 (discussing the Supreme Court's
holdings on the substantive issues). A detailed discussion of the non-jurisdictional issues
inAT&Tis beyond the scope of this Note.
55. See California v. FCC, 124 F.3d 934, 938-43 (8th Cir. 1997), rev'd in part sub nom.
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999). California involved a jurisdictional
challenge to the FCC's rules implementing the dialing parity obligations imposed by 47
U.S.C. § 251(b)(3) (Supp. 111997). The dialing parity rules forbid local exchange carriers
from requiring competitors' customers to dial extra digits to place their phone calls. See 47
U.S.C. § 153(15) (Supp. III 1997); BRANDS & LEO, supra note 4, at 377. The Eighth
Circuit held that the FCC had exceeded its authority because § 251(b)(3) did not explicitly
grant the agency jurisdiction. See California, 124 F.3d at 941; see also infra notes 67-72,
249-69 (discussing arguments that an extremely explicit grant of jurisdiction is required to
overcome language in the original Communications Act of 1934 stating that "nothing in
this chapter shall be construed to apply or to give the Commission jurisdiction with respect
to ... charges.., for or in connection with intrastate communication service").
56. 522 U.S. 1089, 1089 (1999) (mem.) (granting certiorari and consolidating Iowa
Utilities Board and California v. FCC).
57. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 378-86.
58. See id. at 385.
59. See id. at 386-96. Four FCC rules were challenged on substantive grounds in the
Eighth Circuit and reconsidered on appeal by the Supreme Court. The first three rules
concern the scope of ILECs' unbundling duties under 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3). The first rule,
the "all elements rule," refers to the FCC's decision not to impose a facilities-ownership
requirement on carriers requesting unbundled access; because they do not have to own
any facilities, CLECs may lease "all elements" from an ILEC. See First Report & Order,
supra note 7, 328-40,11 F.C.C.R. at 15,666-71. The second rule, Rule 315(b), prohibits
ILECs from separating previously combined network elements before offering them to
competitors for resale to their customers. See 47 C.F.R. § 51.315(b) (1999). The third
rule, Rule 319, required ILECs to provide requesting carriers with unbundled access to a
specific list of network elements. See id. § 51.319, vacated by AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils.
Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 392 (1999). ILECs challenged Rule 319 on two grounds, arguing both
that the Rule included items that were not "network elements" under 47 U.S.C. § 153(29)
and that the FCC had failed to comply with the terms of 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2) in
developing the list. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 808-12 (8th Cir. 1997), affd
inpart, rev'd inpartsub. nom AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999); see also
infra note 60 (discussing Rule 319 in more detail). The fourth rule, known as the "pick
and choose" rule, implements 47 U.S.C. § 252(i). The regulation requires that CLECs be
granted access to "any individual interconnection, service, or network element" on the
"same rates, terms, and conditions" that the ILEC had given to any other CLEC in an
agreement approved by a state utilities commission. 47 C.F.R. § 51.809(a) (1999).
60. The Court upheld the FCC's definition of "network element," the "all elements"
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Justice Rehnquist, Justice Thomas, and Justice Breyer dissented from
the majority's jurisdictional holding.6'
rule, the "pick and choose" rule, and Rule 315(b). See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 386-87, 392-96;
supra note 59 (explaining the rules). The Court vacated Rule 319, however, holding that
the FCC's methodology in developing the list of network elements to be provided on an
unbundled basis to CLECs was based on an unreasonable interpretation of 47 U.S.C.
§ 251(d)(2). See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 392. Justice Souter dissented from the decision to
vacate Rule 319. See id. at 398 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Section 251(d)(2) requires the FCC to decide which network elements should be
provided to CLECs on an unbundled basis by determining whether access to proprietary
network elements is "necessary" for a CLEC and whether failure to provide access to
nonproprietary network elements would "impair the [CLEC's] ability ... to provide the
services that it seeks to offer." 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2). The Court held that the "necessary"
and "impair" language requires the FCC to fashion "some limiting standard, rationally
related to the goals of the Act," that would restrict the availability of network elements to
requesting carriers. AT&T, 525 U.S. at 388. The Court vacated Rule 319 because it
concluded that the Rule failed to provide a limitation. See id.
Although the Court's treatment of Rule 319 did not explicitly reference Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), AT&T
appears to be a rare instance in which the Court has struck down an agency regulation at
step two of the Chevron analysis by declaring the administrative interpretation of an
ambiguous statute to be unreasonable. See Note, A Pragmatic Approach to Chevron, 112
HARV. L. REV. 1723, 1724 n.9 (1999). See generally Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44
(outlining a framework for judicial review of an agency interpretation of a statute that the
agency is entrusted to administer). Under the Chevron analysis, reviewing courts must
first decide "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue."
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. If Congress has so spoken, the court must interpret the statue in
accordance with the "unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Id. at 843. When "the
statute is silent or ambiguous," the reviewing court must ask whether the agency's
interpretation is a "permissible" or "reasonable" one. Id. at 843-44. The court must defer
to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes "unless they are either arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Id. at 844. See generally Thomas W.
Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 975-93 (1992)
(describing the Chevron framework and its sometimes inconsistent effects on Supreme
Court practice); The Honorable Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511 passim (1989) (analyzing and detailing the
virtues of the Chevron framework); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After
Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071, 2083-05 (1990) (rationalizing Chevron as an attempt
to approximate congressional intent about when deference to agencies is appropriate and
arguing that this rationale suggests some limits on the scope of Chevron deference).
In late 1999, the FCC issued a Third Report and Order on local competition that
reformulated the "necessary" and "impair" standards of Rule 319 in response to AT&T.
See 65 Fed. Reg. 2542 (2000) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 51); Implementation of the
Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third Report and
Order (Sept. 15, 1999), available at <http'//www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/
Orders/1999/fcc99238.pdf> (visited Apr. 14,2000).
61. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, which
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Breyer joined. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 402-12
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Breyer also filed a separate
opinion in which he further developed his disagreement with the Court's jurisdictional
holding and added his own reasons for dissenting from the majority's decision to vacate
Rule 319. See id. at 412-31 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
O'Connor took no part in the consideration of the case. See id. at 369.
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The Court based its jurisdictional holding on a sixty-year-old
provision in the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 201(b),
which states that "[t]he Commission may prescribe such rules and
regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the
provisions of this chapter." 62 The Court reasoned that § 201(b) gives
the FCC jurisdiction over local telephone competition because
Congress expressly chose to insert the 1996 enactments into the 1934
Act.63 Although § 201(a) focuses on the duties of common carriers
"'engaged in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio,' "
the Court rejected arguments by the state commissions and ILECs
that the jurisdictional grant in § 201(b) must be limited to matters of
interstate communications. 64  Instead, the Court interpreted
§ 201(b)'s language as authorizing the FCC to implement whatever
regulations are "'necessary in the public interest' "65 to carry out 47
U.S.C. §§ 251 and 252.1
The Court also rejected the Eighth Circuit's jurisdictional
analysis. The court of appeals placed great weight on 47 U.S.C.
§ 152(b), a provision passed as part of the original Communications
62. 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994); see AT&T, 525 U.S. at 377-78. The term "this chapter"
in the statute refers to Chapter 5 ("Wire or Radio Communications") of Title 47
("Telegraphs, Telephones, and Radiotelegraphs") of the U.S. Code. The quoted language
from § 201(b) became law in 1938. See Act of May 31, 1938, ch. 296, 52 Stat. 588, 588
(adding the final two sentences to § 201(b)). Instead of "this chapter," the session law
version of § 201(b) referred to "this Act," meaning the Communications Act of 1934 as
amended. See id. (using "this Act" in reference to the Communications Act of 1934, ch.
652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-614 (West Supp.
1999))). The difference in wording does not effect any substantive change-every
provision of "this chapter" is also a provision of "this Act." For ease of reference, all
citations to the Communications Act of 1934 as amended will be to the U.S. Code version.
This Note, however, follows the Supreme Court's practice in AT&T of using "this [Act]"
in its discussion of § 201(b) while citing to the U.S. Code.
63. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 377-78 (citing the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-104, § 1(b), 110 Stat. 56, 56 (directing that the 1996 Act be codified as part of
the Communications Act of 1934)).
64. l& at 378 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 201(a)).
65. Id. at 377 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 201(b)).
66. See id. at 378. In its opening brief, the FCC cited several other general
jurisdictional provisions in the amended Communications Act of 1934 to support its
jurisdictional claims, including 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1994) (stating that the FCC may
"[m]ake such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not
inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this [Act]"), 47
U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. III 1997) (creating the FCC to "execute and enforce the provisions of
this [Act]"), and 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (1994) (stating that the FCC may "perform any and all
acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this Act,
as may be necessary in the execution of its functions"). See Opening Brief for Federal
Petitioners at 19-20 & n.5, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999) (No. 97-
831). The Supreme Court did not address the FCC's interpretations of §§ 151, 154(i), and
303(r).
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Act of 1934, which states that " 'nothing in this chapter shall be
construed to apply or to give the Commission jurisdiction with respect
to ... charges ... for or in connection with intrastate communication
service.' "67 In light of § 152(b), the Eighth Circuit held that "a
statute must both unambiguously apply to intrastate
telecommunication matters and unambiguously direct the FCC to
implement its provisions" in order to grant the FCC intrastate
jurisdiction.6s Concluding that the 1996 Act's pricing provisions failed
the second prong of this test, the court held that the FCC lacked
jurisdiction to impose its TELRIC methodology on the state
commissions. 69 The Supreme Court majority, however, declared that
the second part of § 152(b)'s disjunction ("or to give the Commission
jurisdiction") only limits the FCC's "ancillary jurisdiction" to regulate
intrastate communications based solely on their indirect effects on
interstate communications.70 The majority concluded that FCC
jurisdiction automatically follows whenever the Act applies." The
Court held, therefore, that because the 1996 Act clearly "applies" to
intrastate communications, the FCC's authority is co-extensive with
the substantive scope of the Act by virtue of § 201(b).72
After offering its expansive reading of FCC jurisdiction, the
Court considered the possibility that the language of specific sections
of the Act might override the FCC's general jurisdiction, thereby
67. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 796-98 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting 47 U.S.C.
§ 152(b) (1994)) (emphasis added), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. AT&T Corp. v.
Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999); see also Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 2(b),
48 Stat. at 1065 (adopting the provision initially).
68. Iowa Utils. Bd., 120 F.3d at 798. The court read the disjunctive language of
§ 152(b) in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Louisiana Public Service Commission
v. FCC ("Louisiana PSC"), 476 U.S. 355 (1986). See Iowa Utils. Bd., 120 F.3d at 796-800.
In Louisiana PSC, the Court held that only "unambiguous" or "straightforward" language
can overcome the limits on FCC jurisdiction established by § 152(b). 476 U.S. at 377; see
also infra notes 117-27,261-67 and accompanying text (discussing Louisiana PSC).
69. See Iowa Utils. Bd., 120 F.3d at 796-98.
70. AT&T, 525 U.S. at 380-81. The FCC's ancillary jurisdiction gives the Commission
implied powers to perform acts that may be necessary to the proper performance of its
primary functions. See 47 U.S.C. § 154(i).
71. See AT&T,525 U.S. at 380.
72. See id. The Court also upheld the FCC's jurisdiction to issue rules implementing
several other provisions in the 1996 Act: 47 U.S.C. § 252(a) (Supp. III 1997) (requiring
state commission approval of interconnection agreements negotiated before the 1996 Act
became law), 47 U.S.C. § 251(f) (outlining conditions under which some rural telephone
companies may be exempted from the duties imposed on ILECs by § 251(c)), and 47
U.S.C. § 251(b)(3) (requiring local exchange carriers to provide dialing parity to
competitors). See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 385 (reversing the Eighth Circuit); see also infra note
157 (discussing how these jurisdictional issues would be resolved under various textual
interpretations of the 1996 Act).
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reserving some matters for state control.73  The state utility
commissions and ILECs had argued that because 47 U.S.C.
§ 252(c)(2) directs state commissions to "'establish any rates for
interconnection, services, or network elements according to
[§ 252](d),'" the FCC has no authority to issue pricing regulations.74
In response, the Court reasoned that being required to follow a
pricing standard set by the FCC is compatible with the states' duty to
"'establish ... rates.' "75 If the state commissions could be said to
establish rates when they follow the pricing standards of § 252(d), the
Court reasoned, they could also be said to establish rates when they
follow the FCC's TELRIC rules.7 6 Similarly, the Court dismissed an
argument that the states must retain pricing authority under the Act
because subsection (c)(1) of § 252 requires state commissions to
ensure that arbitrated interconnection agreements comply with
particular FCC regulations, whereas subsection (c)(2) directs the state
commissions to establish rates according to the statutory standard
without reference to FCC regulations.77
Justice Thomas, joined by both Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Breyer, concurred in part, but dissented from the majority's
jurisdictional holdings.78 Justice Thomas rejected the majority's
analysis of § 201(b), reasoning that the section's jurisdictional grant is
73. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 383 (distinguishing objections based on a lack of
"underlying" or "general" FCC jurisdiction from those claiming that specific provisions of
the Act displace the Commission's rulemaking authority in favor of the states).
74. Id. at 383-84 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 252(c)(2)). Section 252(d) states that state
commissions should set prices that are "based on the cost ... of providing the
interconnection or network element" and that are "nondiscriminatory." 47 U.S.C.
§ 252(d)(1)(A)(i), (ii). Such prices "may include a reasonable profit." Id. § 252(d)(1)(B).
75. AT&T, 525 U.S. at 384 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 252(c)(2)).
76. See id. The Court acknowledged that the states would have greater autonomy
under the § 252(d) standards, but nonetheless held that the application of the TELRIC
rules to particular circumstances was enough to qualify as "establishing rates" for purposes
of the statute. See id. at 379 n.6, 384.
77. See id. at 384-85. Section 252(c)(1) requires states to "ensure that [the
agreements] meet the requirements of section 251 of this title, including the regulations
prescribed by the Commission pursuant to section 251 of this title," while (c)(2) requires
them to "establish any rates for interconnection, services, or network elements according
to subsection (d) of this section." 47 U.S.C. § 252(c)(1), (2) (emphasis added); see also
supra note 49 (quoting the statute more extensively). The Court acknowledged the "lack
of parallelism" between subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2), but thought it inadequate to
displace the FCC's authority under 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994). AT&T, 525 U.S. at 384-85.
This Note considers the lack of parallelism argument at length. See infra notes 185-99,
233-38 and accompanying text.
78. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 402-12 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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limited by its context to interstate and foreign communications.79 He
criticized the FCC for disregarding the "100-year tradition of state
authority over intrastate telecommunications," a tradition historically
protected by § 152(b). 0 Like the Eighth Circuit, Justice Thomas
would have required " 'unambiguous' " and " 'straightforward' "
evidence that the 1996 Act gave the FCC jurisdiction over intrastate
matters.8 1  Recognizing FCC jurisdiction on a lesser showing, he
argued, would fail to respect the "jurisdictional fence" erected by
§ 152(b). 2 Justice Thomas agreed with the Eighth Circuit that § 251's
directive to the FCC to establish regulations within six months of the
Act's passage did not create jurisdiction over the entire statute. 8
Instead, he concluded that the FCC has jurisdiction only over those
subsections of § 251 that specifically mention the FCC.' Finally,
Justice Thomas concluded that by giving the states primary
responsibility for mediating, arbitrating, and approving
79. See id. at 408 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Thomas argued that, because all of 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) and the first sentence of 47 U.S.C.
§ 201(b) are clearly limited to interstate or foreign communications, § 201(b) could not be
read fairly to grant the Commission regulatory authority over local telephone competition.
See id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
80. Id. at 407,409 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
81. Id. at 409 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC ("Louisiana PSC"), 476 U.S. 355, 377 (1986)); see
also infra note 128 (discussing the standard set in Louisiana PSC).
82. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Eighth Circuit had
described 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) as a fence that is "hog tight, horse high, and bull strong,
preventing the FCC from intruding on the states' intrastate turf." Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC,
120 F.3d 753, 800 (8th Cir. 1997), affd in part, rev'd in part sub. nom. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa
Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
83. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 406 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(recognizing FCC jurisdiction over only those subsections that mention the FCC); Iowa
Ufils. BcL, 120 F.3d at 794 & n.10 (same). Subsection (d)(1) states: "Within 6 months after
February 8, 1996, the Commission shall complete all actions necessary to establish
regulations to implement the requirements of this section." 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(1); see also
supra note 48 (quoting the statute more extensively).
84. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 406 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The only subsections mentioning the FCC are 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(2) (imposing a duty on
local exchange carriers to provide number portability in accordance with FCC
requirements), § 251(d)(2) (addressing the FCC's role in determining what network
elements must be made available for unbundied access), § 251(e) (directing the FCC to
establish one or more entities to ensure that telephone numbering is administered on an
impartial basis), § 251(g) (directing that interexchange access and interconnection
obligations existing before the 1996 Act should remain in effect until the FCC issues
superseding regulations), and § 251(h)(2) (authorizing the FCC to treat non-ILECs as
ILECs for the purposes of § 251 if certain conditions are met). See 47 U.S.C. § 251; see
also infra notes 173, 175 (discussing number portability in more detail). The majority
objected to Justice Thomas's interpretation, observing that these subsections seem less
like individual grants of authority than like references to authority already conferred
elsewhere. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 381-83 nn.8-9.
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interconnection agreements, Congress consciously had crafted
legislation respecting the states' historical role in intrastate
communicationsY5  Justice Thomas acknowledged that his
interpretation of the Act would enlist the aid of the states in
interpreting and applying federal law, but he saw no constitutional
difficulty in such an arrangement. 6
Justice Breyer, concurring in part and dissenting in part, sought
to provide added support for Justice Thomas's jurisdictional
conclusions by reading the 1996 Act in light of "history, purpose, and
precedent."'  Justice Breyer argued that the Act's purpose of
encouraging telephone competition without wasteful duplication of
facilities does not require displacement of the states' traditional
power to regulate intrastate rates.s Indeed, he insisted that allowing
state regulators to control rates would utilize their expertise about the
particularities of local markets and would allow the states to serve as
testing grounds for different approaches to promoting
telecommunications competition.89  He concluded that, at most, the
Act authorizes the FCC to set limits defining a range of permissible
pricing schemes that the states may employ while ruling out schemes
that would undermine the Act's objectives.' According to Justice
85. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 410-11 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
86. See id. at 411-12 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 519-20 (1883)). Justice Thomas noted that Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), prohibits the "commandeer[ing]" of state executive
agencies, but not their participation in applying and interpreting federal law. AT&T, 525
U.S. at 411 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Printz, 521 U.S.
at 925-29). The Act respects Printz's anticommandeering principle because 47 U.S.C.
§ 252(e)(5) gives states the choice of either mediating and arbitrating interconnection
agreements according to federal standards or being preempted by the FCC. See Weiser,
supra note 38, at 19 n.72 (citing MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Bell South Telecomms., Inc., 9
F. Supp. 2d 766,772 (E.D. Ky. 1998)).
87. AT&T, 525 U.S. at 412 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88. See id. at 417 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
89. See id. at 417-18 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also
Weiser, supra note 38, at 31-35 (stating that the ability of the states to serve as
"laboratories of democracy" is an important benefit of cooperative federalism schemes
such as the Telecommunications Act (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262,
311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
90. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 418 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Breyer found support for his interpretation of FCC pricing authority in 47 U.S.C.
§ 253, which directs the FCC to preempt any state or local statute, regulation, or legal
requirement that effectively prohibits any carrier from providing interstate or intrastate
telecommunications service. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 418 (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). According to Justice Breyer, if the FCC decided after notice and
opportunity for public comment that state-determined rates for interconnection and
unbundled access were high enough to prohibit market entry by competitors, the FCC
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Breyer, the FCC had deprived the states of pricing autonomy by
mandating the use of a highly detailed pricing methodology,
TELRIC, which is only one among many possible methodologies that
would serve the Act's purposes. 91
Justice Breyer also argued that the language of 47 U.S.C. §§ 251
and 252 reads most naturally as preserving state authority over
intrastate ratemaking.92 He further maintained that the legislative
history of the Act supports a narrow reading of FCC jurisdiction,
noting that both the House and Senate versions of the Act would
have amended § 152(b) to render it inapplicable to the new local
competition provisions.93 Because these amendments had been
would be required to preempt the state's pricing scheme. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). But cf. McLaughlin, supra note 26, at 2230-31 (noting that the
scope of the FCC's preemptive authority under § 253 is unclear and, thus, likely to
produce extensive litigation).
91. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 424-27 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (surveying different pricing methodologies to support the claim that the FCC's
TELRIC rules do not stop at defining a class of permissible pricing schemes).
92. See id. at 418-20 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Apparently accepting Justice Thomas's claim that FCC jurisdiction is limited to those
subsections of 47 U.S.C. § 251 that specifically mention the FCC, Justice Breyer pointed
out that the subsections of § 251 dealing with rates make no mention of the FCC and
therefore concluded that they do not determine jurisdiction to regulate rates for
interconnection and unbundled access. See id. at 418-20 (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). In contrast, § 252(c)(2) authorizes state commissions to
"'establish any rates' " for interconnection and unbundled access. Id. at 419-20 (Breyer,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 252(c)(2) (Supp. III
1997)). Justice Breyer concluded that the explicit references to state ratemaking authority
in § 252 and the lack of references to the FCC in the ratemaking provisions of § 251
indicate that the 1996 Act was intended to preserve the states' traditional power over local
telephone rates. See id. at 420 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Note, however, that if § 251(d)(1) is read as a plenary grant of FCC authority over
§ 251, the FCC arguably is granted pricing authority to set the "just, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory" rates discussed in § 251(c)(2)(D) and (c)(3). See infra notes 177--84; cf.
Jim Chen, TELRIC in Turmoi4 Telecommunications in Transition: A Note on the Iowa
Utilities Board Litigation, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 51, 73-76 (1998) (arguing that
§ 251(d)(1) confers FCC rulemaking power over all aspects of § 251).
93. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 422-23 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Both bills exempted "part II of title II," which includes the provisions that were
codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-261. See S. 652, 104th Cong., § 101(c)(2) (1995) (Sup. Docs.
No. Y1.4/1:104-652); H.R. 1555, 104th Cong., § 101(e)(1) (1995) (Sup. Docs. No.
Y1.416:104-1555). Justice Breyer was the only Justice writing in AT&T who used
legislative history to support his position. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 422-23 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Compare Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of
Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 passim (1992) (arguing
that legislative history can be helpful if used with appropriate caution), with Antonin
Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 29-37 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (arguing for a
blanket rejection of appeals to legislative history in statutory interpretation).
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dropped when the final bill emerged from the House-Senate
Conference Committee, Justice Breyer concluded that Congress had
intended to preserve the limitations on FCC power established by
§ 152(b).94
The Supreme Court's decision in AT&T effects a significant shift
in the balance of power between federal and state communications
regulators. Under the Communications Act of 1934, jurisdiction over
communications was divided along interstate-intrastate lines: the
federal government regulated interstate matters, while intrastate
matters were left to the states95 The 1996 Act clearly changed this
traditional division of jurisdictional labor, but before the Court's
decision in AT&T, no one knew exactly how significant those changes
were.96 A brief review of the history of "telecommunications
federalism" 97 will provide the necessary background for evaluating
the Court's resolution of the jurisdictional questions in AT&T.
The federal government's first venture into telephone regulation,
the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, gave the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) jurisdiction over interstate and international
communications. 98  Although the ICC exerted relatively little
influence on the communications industry,99 the Supreme Court's
decision in the Shreveport Rate Cases10° gave the ICC broad power to
94. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 422-23 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (stating that statutes should not be interpreted on the assumption that Congress
"'."intend[ed] sub silentio to enact statutory language that it ha[d] earlier discarded in
favor of other language" ' " (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442-43 (1987)
(quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 392-93 (1980)
(Stewart, J., dissenting))) (alteration in original)); infra notes 128-51 and accompanying
text (discussing the 1996 Act's legislative history in more detail).
95. See BRANDS & LEO, supra note 4, at 39 (describing in broad terms the regulatory
scheme established by the Communications Act of 1934).
96. See id. at 83 (noting that in 1998 it was "still too early to tell" how much the 1996
Act had shifted the federal-state balance of power in communications law).
97. Id. at 39. The label "telecommunications federalism" is taken from a chapter title
in id. Justice Thomas briefly reviewed the history of telecommunications federalism in his
dissent. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 402-04 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). See generally MICHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
LAW §§ 2.1-.12, at 77-112 (1992) (reviewing the history of telecommunications federalism
prior to the 1996 Act); McLaughlin, supra note 26, at 2213-24 (same).
98. See Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, ch. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. 539, 544-45 (amending § 1 of
the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887) (repealed with regard to communications by the
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 602(b), 48 Stat. 1064, 1102).
99. See KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 97, § 2.3, at 80-81 (stating that the ICC did little
to regulate communications rates because it was "preoccupied with railroad regulation").
100. Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States ("Shreveport Rate Cases"), 234
U.S. 342 (1914).
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preempt state regulations generally.'0' State communications
interests feared the implications of the Shreveport Rate Cases for the
states' authority over intrastate communications,"° so they sought
clear limits on federal authority when pressure for regulatory reform
in the communications industry began to build in the late 1920s.103
Congress was swayed by such arguments during the debate over the
Communications Act of 1934104 and promised broad state autonomy
over intrastate communications via 47 U.S.C. § 152(b). 10 5 As a result,
the newly created Federal Communications Commission had more
limited preemption power than that of other executive agencies.10 6
The 1934 Act purported to create a clear jurisdictional division of
101. See id. at 358-59. The Court authorized the ICC to regulate intrastate commerce
solely because of its effects on interstate commerce, see id. at 353 (stating that Congress
has "the power to foster and protect interstate commerce, and to take all measures
necessary or appropriate to that end, although intrastate transactions of interstate carriers
may thereby be controlled"), even though the ICC's enabling act denied it jurisdiction
over intrastate matters, see Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 (amending the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887) (repealed with regard to communications by the
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 602(b), 48 Stat. at 1102).
102. See KELLOGG ET AL, supra note 97, § 2.6, at 84 n.3.
103. See id. § 2.6, at 84. John E. Benton, the General Solicitor for the National
Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners, argued during a House hearing that
Congress should take steps to protect intrastate communications from the sorts of federal
intrusions sanctioned by the Shreveport Rate Cases. See Hearings on H.R. 8301 Before the
House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong. 136 (1934) (statement of
John E. Benton), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS Acr
OF 1934, at 482 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989). On the legislative history relating to federal-
state relations in the 1934 Act, see Richard McKenna, Preemption Under the
Communications Act, 37 FED. COMM. L.J. 1,12-18 (1985).
104. See McKenna, supra note 103, at 9; see also Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC
("Louisiana PSC"), 476 U.S. 355, 372 (1986) ("[Section 152(b)] was proposed and
supported by the state commissions in reaction to what they perceived to be the evil of
excessive federal regulation of intrastate service such as was sanctioned by the Shreveport
Rate Case .... "); North Carolina Utils. Comm'n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036, 1047 (4th Cir.
1977) ("[lIn enacting the Communications Act, Congress sought to deny the FCC the kind
of jurisdiction over local rates approved by the Shreveport Rate Case.").
105. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 2(b), 48 Stat. 1064, 1065 (codified at 47
U.S.C. § 152(b) (1994)) ("[N]othing in this chapter shall be construed to apply or to give
the Commission jurisdiction with respect to ... charges, classifications, practices, services,
facilities, or regulations for or in connection with intrastate communications service by
wire or radio of any carrier .... "). The Senate Report stated that this provision "reserves
to the States exclusive jurisdiction over intrastate telephone and telegraph
communication." S. REP. No. 73-781, at 3 (1934), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE COMMUNICATIONS Acr OF 1934, supra note 103, at 711,711-21.
106. See KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 97, § 2.7.3, at 88 (citing, e.g., City of New York v.
FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63 (1988); Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 694 (1984)).
The limits imposed by § 152(b) are purely statutory rather than constitutional. See
McLaughlin, supra note 26, at 2213 (noting that the Commerce Clause would permit the
FCC to exercise broad authority over intrastate communications).
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labor: the FCC regulated interstate communications, while intrastate
communications were reserved to the states.10' Unfortunately, the
realities of telephone service belie this clear division because nearly
all telephone equipment is used for both intrastate and interstate
calls.1"8 Congress recognized this difficulty to a limited extent in the
1934 Act by authorizing the FCC to develop rules for allocating the
costs of telephone plants between interstate and intrastate uses.10 9
Nonetheless, courts have struggled with the "persistent jurisdictional
tension" created by § 152(b)." 0
In early FCC preemption cases, courts were reluctant to enforce
the apparent jurisdictional limitations imposed by § 152(b)."' For
example, in North Carolina Utilities Commission v. FCC,"2 the Fourth
Circuit upheld the FCC's preemption of state regulations of "terminal
equipment""' despite the fact that such equipment is used extensively
in intrastate communications."4 The court agreed with the FCC that
because the same pieces of terminal equipment are used in both
interstate and intrastate communications, it would be impossible to
divide the regulation of such equipment between the FCC and state
commissions." 5  Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit characterized
107. See Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, §§ 1, 2(b), 48 Stat. at 1064-65 (codified
at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151,152(b)); Louisiana PSC, 476 U.S. at 360.
108. See Louisiana PSC, 476 U.S. at 360; see also KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 97,
§ 2.7, at 85-86 (noting a "fundamental paradox in the idea that a service whose entire
purpose is to obliterate distance and transcend geographic boundaries can be regulated by
dual authority divided along strictly geographic lines").
109. See Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 221(c), 48 Stat. at 1080-81 (codified at
47 U.S.C. § 221(c) (1994)). Rules for jurisdictional separation also must be approved by a
joint federal-state board. See 47 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1994). The separations process has been
criticized as "essentially arbitrary." KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 97, § 2.7.3, at 89.
110. Public Utils. Comm'n of Tex. v. FCC, 886 F.2d 1325, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1989). See
generally Jonathan Jacob Nadler, Give Peace a Chance: FCC-State Relations After
California 111, 47 FED. COMM. L.J. 457, 462-88 (1995) (reviewing the history of the
"border wars" between the FCC and the states); Michael J. Zpevak, FCC Preemption
After Louisiana PSC, 45 FED. COMM. LJ. 185, 190-217 (1993) (discussing the effects of
Louisiana PSC on FCC preemption of state regulations); McLaughlin, supra note 26, at
2214-21 (providing a brief overview of the case law examining the FCC's power to
preempt state law despite the limits of § 152(b)).
111. See Richard McKenna, Preemption Reversed The Supreme Court's Decision il
Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC, 39 ADMIN. L. REv. 43, 53 (1987) (stating
that the pre-Louisiana PSC rule in preemption cases was simple: "The FCC always
wins.").
112. 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1976).
113. "Terminal equipment," which is also called "customer premises equipment," is
equipment that customers attach to the telephone network, from telephones to faxes and
computer terminals. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 97, glossary at 853-54, 864.
114. See North Carolina Utils. Comm'n, 537 F.2d at 793.
115. See id. at 791.
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§ 152(b) as a relatively loose constraint on FCC power."6
In the mid-1980s, the Supreme Court's decision in Louisiana
Public Service Commission v. FCC ("Louisiana PSC")" 7 heralded a
shift in judicial attitude towards § 152(b)."8 In Louisiana PSC, the
Court considered an FCC order preempting state regulations
governing the method of depreciation used in calculating the costs of
telephone plant and equipment for purposes of intrastate
ratemaking." 9 The FCC asserted its preemption authority on two
grounds: (1) that 47 U.S.C. § 220(b) grants the FCC exclusive
jurisdiction over depreciation practices; 20 and (2) that prohibiting
preemption of state depreciation regulations would frustrate
important federal policies." The Court rejected both arguments.'2
116. See id. at 794 n.6 ("[T]he purpose of [§ 152(b)] is to restrain the [FCC] from
interfering with those essentially local incidents and practices ... that do not substantially
encroach upon the administration and development of the interstate telephone
network.").
117. 476 U.S. 355 (1986).
118. See McKenna, supra note 111, at 53.
119. See Louisiana PSC, 476 U.S. at 358, 362-63. The Court emphasized that choices
about methods of depreciation significantly affect state ratemaking authority, as
depreciation costs are an important part of the calculations used by state utility
commissions in setting retail rates for telephone service. See id. at 364-65.
120. See id. at 366. Section 220(b) originally required the FCC to prescribe
depreciation practices for all carriers subject to the Communications Act of 1934. See 47
U.S.C. § 220(b) (1994), amended by 47 U.S.C. § 220(b) (Supp. III 1997). The 1996 Act
amended § 220(b) to say that the FCC "may prescribe" depreciation rates "for such
carriers as it determines to be appropriate"-a change designed to allow the FCC to
refrain from regulating depreciation rates if it so chooses. Telecommunications Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 403(d), 110 Stat. 56,130 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 220(b) (Supp.
1111997)).
121. See Louisiana PSC, 476 U.S. at 373-75. The FCC asserted that if states used
inappropriate depreciation methods, investment in new facilities would be discouraged
because carriers would be unable to obtain adequate returns on their investments. See id.
at 374. Because any decrease in telephone plant investment would impair interstate
communications, the FCC argued that it should be allowed to preempt state depreciation
practices inconsistent with FCC rules. See id. at 373-74. Noting that jurisdiction over
telephone networks is divided, the FCC also argued that it must have preemptive
authority because allowing the states and the FCC to depreciate the same facilities in two
different ways would be senseless. See id. at 375.
122. See id. at 371-77. Several commentators have criticized the Louisiana PSC
decision. See Jonathan Galst, "Phony" Intent?: An Examination of Regulatory-
Preemption Jurisprudence, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 108, 143-53 (1992) (arguing that the
Communications Act of 1934 did not compel the Court's decision in Louisiana PSC and
that the decision is inconsistent with the Court's regulatory preemption jurisprudence in
other areas); Paul E. McGreal, Some Rice with Your Chevron?: Presumption and
Deference in Regulatory Preemption, 45 CAsE W. RES. L. REv. 823, 888 (1995) (dismissing
the Court's decision in Louisiana PSC as another example of its incoherent approach to
regulatory preemption); Zpevak, supra note 110, at 185-86 (suggesting that Louisiana
PSC might make it difficult for the FCC to fulfill its congressional mandate to implement
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While acknowledging that the language of § 220(b) could be read to
support the FCC's position, the Court concluded that the statute's
language was insufficiently "unambiguous" and "straightforward" to
overcome the restrictions on FCC power established by § 152(b).121
As a result, the Court held that § 220(b) did not preempt state
depreciation regulations used for intrastate ratemaking.124 The Court
also rejected the FCC's policy arguments, holding that § 152(b)
prevents the FCC from "confer[ing] power upon itself" merely
because it thinks its intervention will best promote federal policies.'21
The Court acknowledged that it would uphold FCC jurisdiction in
cases in which the interstate and intrastate components of a
regulation were inseparable, but concluded that on the facts
presented in Louisiana PSC, different depreciation methods could be
applied to the same facility by allocating charges between interstate
and intrastate uses of that facility. 26 In the wake of Louisiana PSC,
lower courts began protecting the states more vigorously against FCC
preemption.m
Against the background of continuing tension over the
interpretation of § 152(b), the 1996 Act marked an unprecedented
expansion of federal authority over intrastate communications.'2
Members of Congress talked of reasserting their proper role in
telecommunications regulation by passing the 1996 Act, 29 but they
national telecommunications policy).
123. Louisiana PSC, 476 U.S. at 377. The Court apparently reasoned that if no statute
should be "'construed to apply or to give the Commission jurisdiction' over intrastate
service,' "sufficiently clear language could satisfy § 152(b) because it would not have to be
"construed" by the courts in order to create jurisdiction. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 152(b)
(1994)) (emphasis added).
124. See i. at 376-78.
125. Id. at 374.
126. See id. at 375-76 & n.4. Recognizing this "impossibility exception" to 47 U.S.C.
§ 152(b) enabled the Court to distinguish cases like North Carolina Utilities Commission v.
FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1976), described supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
127. See Nadler, supra note 110, at 473-74 (citing California v. FCC ("California I"),
905 F.2d 1217, 1230-39 (9th Cir. 1990); National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v.
FCC, 880 F.2d 422, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). One commentator, however, has argued that
the pendulum swung back toward the FCC in the early 1990s. See Nadler, supra note 110,
at 482-88 (discussing judicial rejection of the states' "extravagant" attacks on FCC power
in the early 1990s (citing California v. FCC ("California III"), 39 F.3d 919, 932-33 (9th Cir.
1994); California v. FCC ("California II"), 4 F.3d 1505,1515 (9th Cir. 1993))). The Court's
decision in AT&T appears to confirm Nadler's thesis.
128. See McLaughlin, supra note 26, at 2229 (stating that the 1996 Act clearly gives the
FCC at least some authority over intrastate matters). The FCC has described the 1996 Act
as "mov[ing] beyond" the 1934 Act's division between interstate and intrastate
communications. First Report & Order, supra note 7, 24, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15,513.
129. Senator Pressler, the sponsor of the Senate bill, said that with the 1996 Act,
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left many details of the new regulatory model to be worked out by the
courts. The legislative history as a whole suggests that Congress
wanted the FCC to create national standards that would forestall
possible state resistance to competition, but that legislators also
intended to give states the ability to tailor the implementation of the
Act to local conditions.130 Whether the states were to be allowed
some freedom in tailoring pricing to local conditions is unclear.
In at least three ways, the House and Senate bills more strongly
favored FCC pricing authority than did the bill that emerged from the
Conference Committee. First, both Houses approved amendments to
§ 152(b) that would have bolstered the FCC's claims to pricing
authority by exempting the local telephone competition provisions
from its reach.' The final bill, however, left § 152(b) unchanged.3
Second, the Senate bill included both interconnection requirements
and the arbitration process in a single section governed by a single
implementation provision that appeared to give the FCC authority
over all aspects of the section, including pricing standards. 133 The
final bill, in contrast, separated interconnection and arbitration into
two sections-§§ 251 and 252-and left the FCC's implementation
Congress sought to "reassert its proper policy role and administer a new Federal policy
designed to promote competition, innovation, and [to] protect consumers." 141 CONG.
REc. 15,100 (June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Pressler); see also 142 CONG. REC. 2044
(Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Chafee) (noting that most federal statutory
communications law was 61 years old and arguing that the law should be updated to
address technological changes in the communications industry).
130. See McLaughlin, supra note 26, at 2236 (basing these conclusions on a review of
the legislative history of the 1996 Act); see also S. REP. No. 104-23, at 15 (1995) (Sup.
Does. No. Y1.1/5:104-23) ("[T]he FCC will establish the national minimum standards for
opening local telephone networks and other competitive requirements. The States are
then responsible for administering, implementing, and resolving disputes as
telecommunications carriers meet these obligations."). These formulations of
congressional intent are insufficiently precise to resolve the jurisdictional questions
presented in AT&T. For example, saying that the states are charged with "administering,
implementing, and resolving disputes" with respect to the pricing of interconnection and
unbundled access, S. REP. No. 104-23, at 15, does not indicate whether they are to be
guided in their tasks by FCC rules.
131. See S. 652, 104th Cong. § 101(c)(2) (1995) (Sup. Dos. No. Y1.4/1:104-652); H.R.
1555, 104th Cong. § 101(e)(1) (1995) (Sup. Dos. No. Y1.4/6:104-1555); supra note 93-94
(noting Justice Breyer's reliance on this aspect of the legislative history in his dissent from
the majority's jurisdictional holding).
132. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,110 Stat. 56 (codified in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
133. See S. 652, § 101(a). The Senate bill's proposed section 251(i) would have directed
the FCC to establish rules implementing the requirements of "this section," which would
have included the directives to set "nondiscriminatory" prices "based on cost" in the
proposed section 251(d)(6).
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authority over pricing standards unclear.TM Third, the House bill
clearly would have directed the FCC to establish pricing regulations,
but the relevant section did not survive in the final bill.135
The Conference Committee report did not explain why these
changes were made or how they were intended to affect jurisdictional
issues, 36 and the floor debates on the final version of the bill were
equally uninformative.137 Furthermore, the House voted to waive the
normal requirement that legislators have three days to study a bill
before a final vote, 38 so many members may not have been aware of
the Conference Committee changes when they voted on the bill.139
Upon comparing the House and Senate bills with the bill that
emerged from the Conference Committee, one could infer that the
conferees reached a variety of compromises on the federal-state
balance of power under the Act. The changes made by the
Conference Committee suggest that the final bill was meant to give
the states greater autonomy than they would have had under either
the House or Senate bills.' ° Yet, even the conference members
134. As enacted, § 251(d)(1) requires the FCC to establish regulations implementing
the requirements of "this section," and so does not explicitly address the FCC's authority
to make rules implementing the statutory pricing standards contained in § 252(d)(1). 47
U.S.C. § 251(d)(1) (Supp. III 1997). Splitting the Senate's proposed section 251 into two
sections suggests that the Conference Committee intended to reserve more power to the
states. But see McLaughlin, supra note 26, at 2232 n.129 (suggesting that because the split
between §§ 251 and 252 arose late in the legislative process and was subject to little
debate, the split should not be interpreted as denying the FCC authority over the
provisions of § 252).
135. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56; H.R. 1555,
§ 101(a); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 121 (1996) (Sup. Docs. No. Y1.1/5:104-458)
(stating that the House bill's proposed section 242(b)(4) "directs the Commission to
establish regulations requiring full compensation to the LEC for costs of providing
services related to equal access, interconnection, number portability, and unbundling"),
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124,131-32.
136. The Conference Report merely notes that unexplained changes included
"conforming changes made necessary by agreements reached by the conferees." See H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 113,1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 124.
137. See 142 CONG. REC. 2206-42 (Feb. 1, 1996) (recording the final House floor
debate on the 1996 Act); 142 CONG. REc. 2008-48 (Feb. 1, 1996) (recording the final
Senate floor debate on the 1996 Act).
138. See id. at 2206,2214-15 (Feb. 1, 1996) (recording the passage of H. Res. 353,104th
Cong. (1996)). The Senate bill also was considered one day after the release of the
Conference Report. See id. at 2008 (Feb. 1, 1996).
139. See id. at 2213 (Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Conyers) ("[T]here are very few,
if any, persons that have read, not to mention understand, what is in the report. That is
why we have a 3-day rule layover.").
140. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 113 (noting that unexplained changes
included "conforming changes made necessary by agreements reached by the conferees"),
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 124. Although the legislative record contains no direct evidence of
debate about the jurisdictional issues at stake in AT&T, Congress was clearly attentive to
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seemed unclear about what those compromises were. Two different
groups of conferees filed amicus briefs with the Eighth Circuit
offering opposing accounts of the Conference Committee's intent.141
The inconclusive character of the legislative history raises suspicions
that the House-Senate conferees may have drafted an intentionally
ambiguous statute to avoid a difficult policy choice. 42
Some observers might suggest that because both House Bill 1555
and Senate Bill 652 clearly would have assigned pricing jurisdiction to
the FCC, Congress's refusal to enact equally clear language in the
final bill warrants a narrow reading of FCC jurisdiction.'43 Professor
federalism concerns in its deliberations about other aspects of the Act. A 1995 floor
debate in the Senate explicitly addressed federal-state relations in the context of an
unsuccessful amendment that attempted to eliminate the Senate bill's proposed section
254, which would have authorized the FCC to preempt state laws that raise barriers to
market entry. See 141 CONG. REC. 15,590-96 (June 12, 1995) (recording debate
concerning the proposed "Feinstein/Kempthorne Amendment" to the Senate bill). This
debate showcased a variety of viewpoints on how to strike the proper balance between
federal and state power. Compare 141 CONG. REC. 15,592-93 (June 12, 1995) (statement
of Sen. Kempthorne) (objecting to the preemption provision as a "disturbing directive"
that would allow an independent federal authority "thousands of miles away" to
"invalidate duly adopted State laws and local ordinances"), with id. at 15,596 (June 12,
1995) (statement of Sen. Pressler) (arguing that without FCC preemption power,
telecommunications investment would diminish because companies could not be certain
that states would not erect barriers to entry). Ultimately, the Senate reached a
compromise that granted the FCC broad preemption powers with an exception for state
rules regarding public rights-of-way; the states retained authority to impose additional,
competitively neutral regulations consistent with those of the FCC. See S. 652, § 201(a)
(1995) (proposing section 254(a)-(d)). This section became the basis for 47 U.S.C. § 253,
which outlines the conditions under which the FCC may act to remove barriers to market
entry imposed by the states.
141. See Brief of Amici Curiae The Honorable John D. Dingell et al., Iowa Utils. Bd. v.
FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-3321) (arguing that Congress intended to
reserve pricing authority to the states), available at <http://ls.wustl.edu/8th.cir/
FCC/fcc.html> (visited April 24, 2000); Brief of Amici Curiae the Honorable Thomas J.
Bliley, Jr. et al., Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-3321)
(arguing that Congress intended to grant the FCC broad jurisdiction over local telephone
competition), available at <http://Is.wustl.edu/8th.cir/FCCI Opinions/FCC/brief.leg>
(visited April 24, 2000). Even if all the legislative amici had agreed about Congress's-or
at least the Conference Committee's-intent, their post-enactment comments probably
should be regarded with skepticism. See ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN
INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 39
(1997) (characterizing post-enactment statements of legislative intent as highly unreliable).
142. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public
Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 288 (1988) (stating that
according to public choice theory, legislators sometimes avoid alienating their constituents
by supporting ambiguous laws and letting courts or agencies determine the meaning of
those laws). More charitably, the conferees may have reasoned that letting the courts
decide the issue of pricing jurisdiction was a small price to pay for the expeditious passage
of an important bill.
143. Justice Breyer made such an argument regarding the decision not to amend 47
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Eskridge has characterized this type of appeal to legislative history as
a "rejected proposal" argument. 144  Although the Court has
sometimes found evidence of legislative intent in a conference
committee rejection,145 it generally has refused to find such rejections
significant when Congress has not faced a "clear referendum" on the
disputed issue.'"
In voting on the 1996 Act, Congress almost certainly neither
faced nor made a clear choice to shift the balance of jurisdictional
power contemplated in the House and Senate bills. The Conference
Committee's changes were unexplained, 147 the floor debate on the
final bill was limited and-to some extent-uninformed,'14 and the
changes in the language affecting jurisdictional issues were subtle. 49
Therefore, the legislative history of the 1996 Act cannot support a
convincing "rejected proposal" argument.50 Indeed, one might easily
U.S.C. § 152(b) (1994). See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 422-23 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. At least one petitioner in
AT&T claimed that the Conference Committee's decision not to amend § 152(b) resulted
from intensive lobbying by the states. See Brief of Bell Atlantic Corp., BellSouth Corp.,
and SBC Communications, Inc. at 25 & n.13, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366
(1999) (No. 97-826) (citing comments submitted to the FCC).
144. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 245-
46 (1994). Eskridge notes that "rejected proposal" arguments have met with a mixed
reception in the Supreme Court. See id. at 245, 312-15 (discussing Supreme Court
"rejected proposal" cases from 1961 to 1991). For an earlier and more extensive
treatment of the same issues, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative
Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67,84-89 (1988).
145. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 199-200 (1974) (stating
that a conference committee's decision to delete a provision "militates against a judgment
that Congress intended a result it expressly declined to enact").
146. ESKRIDGE, supra note 144, at 245 (citing, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 505-06 (1976)). Professor Dickerson argues that legislative
rejection has "little probative value for any purpose" because "[tihere are many reasons
for saying no." REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
STATUTES 160 (1975). Dickerson observes that the decision not to amend a pending bill is
always ambiguous: the legislature might have objected to the policy result the amendment
was meant to achieve, or it might have thought that the amendment was unnecessary
because the current version of the bill already would achieve that result. See id. Similarly,
legislative acceptance of an amendment raises the question whether the amendment
added something new or merely clarified something old. See id. at 161. "Rejected
proposal" arguments also are vulnerable to a variety of general objections to the use of
legislative history in statutory interpretation. See id. at 137-83 (suggesting that the costs of
using legislative history greatly outweigh its meager benefits); ESKRIDGE, supra note 144,
at 207-38 (defending some uses of legislative history and analyzing the "new textualism"
of Justice Scalia); Scalia, supra note 93, at 29-37 (calling for an end to the use of legislative
history in statutory interpretation).
147. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
150. Admittedly, the decision not to amend 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1994) seems more
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use the same legislative history to argue that because both the Senate
and House bills gave the FCC pricing authority and because neither
the final bill nor the Conference Report signaled a clear departure
from the status quo, rank and file members of Congress assumed that
the FCC would have pricing authority when they voted for the Act.
On the whole, then, the legislative history of the 1996 Act offers
no clear answer to the jurisdictional questions raised in AT&T. The
trajectory of change from the House and Senate bills to the final Act
may suggest a movement toward greater state autonomy under the
Act, but does not resolve the question whether the Conference
Committee changes were enough to deprive the FCC of authority to
issue its TELRIC rules. Finding a clear resolution from the text of
the 1996 Act is no easier. The fundamental difficulty is that while
§ 251 appears to give the FCC pricing authority, § 252 seems to
reserve that authority to the states.' This Note examines four
approaches to resolving this interpretive puzzle. While no approach
is completely convincing, textual analysis marginally favors the
conclusion that Congress intended for the states to retain pricing
authority. Thus, the Court's confident affirmation of FCC authority
on textual grounds appears, at best, to have been premature.
Justice Thomas's approach construes FCC jurisdiction in the
narrowest possible manner, limiting it to those sections of § 251 that
explicitly mention the FCC.52 This interpretaion gives the FCC no
authority over pricing because none of the Act's pricing provisions
mentions the FCC.153 The FCC's approach locates the source of its
jurisdiction in § 251(d)(1), which directs the Commission to establish
regulations implementing § 251 within six months of the Act's
passage.lm In contrast, the majority's approach gives the FCC
likely to reflect a deliberate choice than the decision to separate § 251 from § 252 in the
final bill. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (explaining that the Senate's
proposed section 251 became §§ 251 and 252 of the Act). Even the decision not to amend
§ 152(b), however, might have reflected only a conviction that an amendment was not
necessary to extend FCC power over intrastate matters in the 1996 Act. Cf. AT&T, 525
U.S. at 379-80 (holding that the FCC has broad jurisdiction over local telephone
competition despite § 152(b)).
151. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(c)(2)(D), (c)(3), 252(c)(2), (d)(1) (Supp. III 1997); supra
notes 48-49 (quoting §§ 251 and 252).
152. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 406 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
infra notes 158-76 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Thomas's approach in more
detail); see also supra note 84 (listing subsections of § 251 that mention the FCC). Justice
Breyer appears to subscribe to much of Justice Thomas's reasoning. See supra note 92 and
accompanying text.
153. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(c)(2)(D), (c)(3), 252(c)(2), (d)(1).
154. Id § 251(d)(1) ("Within 6 months after February 8, 1996, the Commission shall
complete all actions necessary to establish regulations to implement the requirements of
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discretionary authority over pricing based on § 201(b).155 A fourth
approach, which this Note calls the "modified dissent approach"
because of its kinship to ideas raised in Justice Breyer's opinion, 56
recognizes broad FCC jurisdiction over at least the whole of § 251,
but insists that the language of § 252 removes the pricing of
interconnection and unbundled access from that jurisdiction.5 7
Justice Thomas's approach reserves pricing authority to the
states, but in doing so it relies on an indefensibly narrow reading of
this section." (emphasis added)); see infra notes 177-94 (discussing the FCC's approach in
more detail).
155. See 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994) ("The Commission may prescribe such rules and
regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the provisions of this
[Act]." (emphasis added)); infra notes 195-223 and accompanying text (discussing the
majority's approach in more detail).
156. Like Justice Breyer, the modified dissent approach emphasizes the language of
§ 252(c)(2) and (d)(1). See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 418-20 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The approach differs from Justice Breyer in squarely rejecting Justice
Thomas's extremely narrow reading of FCC jurisdiction. See id. at 419 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing with approval Justice Thomas's claim that
FCC jurisdiction is limited to those subsections of § 251 that explicitly mention the FCC).
157. Of the four approaches considered here, the modified dissent approach probably
has the best claim to respecting the "plain meaning" of § 252. See infra notes 224-38
(discussing this approach in more detail); cf Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 796 n.
15 (8th Cir. 1997) (concluding that "the FCC's belief that it has jurisdiction to issue local
pricing rules conflicts with the plain meaning of the Act"), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub
nom. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999). It would emphasize that in
§ 252, the state commissions are directed explicitly to "establish ... rates," 47 U.S.C.
§ 252(c)(2), while no similarly explicit pricing authority is conferred on the FCC.
If the majority is correct in concluding that § 201(b) is the source of the FCC's
jurisdiction, the minor jurisdictional issues concerning the FCC's rules on dialing parity,
rural carrier exemptions, and approval of interconnection agreements pre-dating the Act
should clearly be resolved in favor of the FCC. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 385 (holding for
the FCC on the minor jurisdictional issues on the ground that the relevant statutory
sections do not displace the FCC's general rulemaking authority under § 201(b)); supra
note 72 (explaining the minor jurisdictional issues in AT&T). The FCC approach clearly
would resolve two of the minor jurisdictional issues-dialing parity and rural carrier
exemptions-in favor of the FCC because both of the relevant sections fall within § 251.
See 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(3) (establishing a duty to provide competitors with dialing parity);
id. § 251(f)(1) (outlining procedures through which some rural telephone companies may
be exempted from the interconnection duties imposed by § 251(c)). Section 251(d)(1),
however, cannot support the FCC's authority to issue rules governing when
interconnection agreements pre-dating the Act must be submitted for state commission
approval, for the relevant statutory provision is not part of § 251. See id. § 252(a)
(requiring that interconnection agreements predating the 1996 Act be submitted to state
commissions for approval pursuant to § 252(e)). Under Justice Thomas's approach, the
FCC would lose on all of the jurisdictional issues in AT&T. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 407
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The modified dissent approach
remains neutral on the question of whether § 201(b) or § 251(d)(1) is the source of FCC
jurisdiction, so it could resolve the minor jurisdictional issues by following either the
majority's approach or the FCC's approach.
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FCC jurisdiction. Justice Thomas argued that § 251(d)(1) is not a
jurisdictional grant at all, but instead serves merely as a timetable for
the issuance of regulations implementing those provisions-and only
those provisions-of § 251 that explicitly mention the Commission. 58
Justice Thomas's reading was prompted in part by his belief that
§ 152(b) requires Congress to meet Louisiana PSC's
"'straightforward' " and "'unambiguous' "language standard to give
the FCC jurisdiction over intrastate matters. 5 9 Yet, even if Justice
Thomas were correct about the import of § 152(b), four reasons
suggest that the language of § 251(d)(1) must be read to imply that
the FCC has jurisdiction over at least the whole scope of § 251.1
First, the language of § 251(d)(1) is read most naturally to imply
that the FCC has the authority to establish regulations for all the
requirements of § 251.161 The Commission is directed to "complete all
actions necessary to establish regulations to implement the
requirements of this section."'62 Nothing in this language indicates
any limitation to those subsections of § 251 that explicitly mention the
FCC.
As noted by Justice Scalia, the second problem with Justice
Thomas's approach is that the subsections of § 251 that explicitly
mention the FCC read less like grants of statutory authority than like
references to authority conferred elsewhere."6' Consider Justice
Thomas's reading of § 251(d)(2), a provision that directs the FCC to
decide which network elements should be provided to CLECs on an
unbundled basis by considering whether access to proprietary
elements is "necessary" and whether access to nonproprietary
158. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 406 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
159. Id. at 409 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Louisiana. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC ("Louisiana PSC"), 476 U.S. 355, 377 (1986)); see
also infra notes 254-69 and accompanying text (criticizing Justice Thomas's reading of
§ 152(b)).
160. Cf Chen, supra note 92, at 71-76 (arguing that § 251(d)(1) should be seen as a
plenary grant of FCC authority to implement the requirements of § 251); McLaughlin,
supra note 26, at 2248 (asserting that a reading that interprets § 251(d)(1) as setting only a
timetable without conferring any authority on the FCC "seems implausible").
161. Even if § 251(d)(1) is read as a timetable for FCC action, rather than as an actual
conferral of authority, it at least presupposes that the FCC has jurisdiction over the whole
of § 251. Arguably, the source of that jurisdiction is § 201(b). Cf. AT&T, 525 U.S. at 381-
82 n.8 (suggesting that some subsections of § 251 are read most naturally as references to
authority conferred in § 201(b)).
162. 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(1).
163. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 381-82 n.8; see also Chen, supra note 92, at 69-70 (stating
that several of the subsections of § 251 that mention the FCC "refer to FCC rulemaking
merely in passing, as though to forestall the need to articulate a more precise statutory
standard until such time as the Commission resolved the matter through rulemaking").
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elements would "impair" a CLEC's ability to compete." 4 According
to Justice Thomas, § 251(d)(2) serves to grant the FCC authority to
formulate standards for unbundled access."65 The text, however,
states that "[i]n determining what network elements should be made
available for purposes of subsection (c)(3), the Commission shall
consider [several factors]."'166 This language appears to presuppose
the FCC's authority to implement § 251(c)(3) and to serve as a limit
on that authority.167 The source of that authority is not § 252(d)(2),
but § 251(c)(3) read in conjunction with the requirement of
§ 251(d)(1) that the FCC take action "to implement the requirements
of this section."'"
Third, the structure of § 251(d) strongly suggests that subsection
(d)(1) is meant to confer broad FCC authority to implement all of the
requirements of § 251.169 Section § 251(d)(3) is a "savings provision"
that forbids the FCC from preempting state interconnection
regulations that go beyond those imposed by the FCC so long as such
additional regulations do not undermine the goals of § 251.170 If, as
Justice Thomas argued, Congress had only granted the Commission
the authority to implement those aspects of § 251 that explicitly
mention the FCC, such a savings provision would have been
unnecessary.171
Finally, neither the state commissions nor Justice Thomas
offered any explanation of why Congress would have chosen to give
the FCC jurisdiction over only a seemingly random subset of the
interconnection regulations in § 251.172 For example, allowing the
FCC to issue regulations governing number portability'73 but not
dialing parity7 4 seems illogical. Both requirements are designed to
164. 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2).
165. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 406 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
166. 47 U.s.C. § 251(d)(2).
167. Cf. Chen, supra note 92, at 73-74 (suggesting that § 251(d)(2) "sets a floor, not a
ceiling" on the FCC's rulemaking power under § 251(d)(1)).
168. 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(1). Because subsection (d)(2) implies a logically prior grant of
FCC authority in subsection (c)(3), Justice Thomas's claim that the FCC has authority
only over those subsections that mention the FCC explicitly cannot be sustained.
169. See Chen, supra note 92, at 74-75.
170. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(3).
171. See Chen, supra note 92, at 74-75.
172. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 382 n.8. (asserting that Justice Thomas's interpretation
produces "a most chopped-up statute").
173. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(2) (alluding to Commission regulations regarding number
portability). Number portability allows retail customers to retain the same phone
numbers when they change carriers. See id § 153(30) (Supp. III 1997).
174. See id § 251(b)(3) (imposing a duty to provide dialing parity without mentioning
any role for the FCC). For a definition of dialing parity, see supra note 55.
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prevent local exchange carriers from undermining competitors by
making it too inconvenient for customers to use the services of those
competitors,175 and both could be handled appropriately by regulation
at the national level. 6 Thus, the absence of any policy rationale for
the jurisdictional lines that Justice Thomas would draw is a final
reason for rejecting his extremely narrow reading of § 251(d)(1).
Justice Thomas's approach cannot be sustained; therefore, the 1996
Act is read properly as giving the FCC mandatory rulemaking power
over all of § 251.
Both the FCC approach and the majority approach would grant
the FCC pricing authority, but they differ on the source of that
jurisdiction. The FCC approach claims that § 251(d)(1) requires the
Commission to establish a pricing methodology, while the majority's
approach grants the FCC discretionary pricing authority by locating
the source of FCC jurisdiction in § 201(b). Although neither
approach can resolve all of the interpretive anomalies created by
§§ 251 and 252, the majority approach provides the stronger case for
FCC pricing authority.
Claiming that § 251(d)(1) is a jurisdictional grant, the FCC
approach argues for pricing authority by claiming that the TELRIC
methodology is an attempt to specify § 251(c)'s mandates for "just,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory"'" pricing. 8 This language is a
175. Both Congress and the FCC viewed the number portability requirements as
essential to promoting local telephone competition. See H.R. REP. No. 104-204, at 72
(1995) (Sup. Docs. No. Y1.1/5:104-204), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 37 (stating that
"the ability to change service providers is only meaningful if a customer can retain his or
her local telephone number"); Telephone Number Portability, 28-31,11 F.C.C.R. 8352,
8367-68 (1996) [hereinafter Number Portability Order] (stating that "a lack of number
portability likely would deter entry by competitive providers of local service because of
the value customers place on retaining their telephone numbers"). Similarly, the FCC
emphasized the importance of dialing parity to local competition in its Second Report and
Order on local competition. See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Second Report and Order, 22, 11 F.C.C.R. 19,392,
19,406 (1996) [hereinafter Second Report & Order] (stating that the dialing parity
requirements "will foster vigorous local exchange and long distance competition by
ensuring that each customer has the freedom and flexibility to choose among different
carriers for different services without the burden of dialing access codes").
176. See Second Report & Order, supra note 175, 25, 11 F.C.C.R. at 19,407
(concluding that "minimum nationwide standards" governing dialing parity will best
promote competition); Number Portability Order, supra note 175, 32-37, 11 F.C.C.R.
at 8368-71 (explaining the need for a uniform national framework governing number
portability).
177. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(D), (c)(3); see also supra note 48 (quoting the statute more
extensively).
178. See First Report & Order, supra note 7, 115-17, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15,559-60
(claiming authority to promulgate national pricing rules for interconnection and
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standard means of delegating ratemaking authority to an executive
agency 179 and echoes the sections of the 1934 Act that authorize the
FCC to regulate pricing for interstate telecommunications. 8 '
Furthermore, § 252(c)(1) directs the state commissions to follow FCC
regulations issued under § 251, which might appear to include any
regulations defining a "just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory"
rate.181 All these points support the FCC approach. While it is true
that § 252 directs the state commissions to "establish"'8 and to make
"determinations" of rates,"8 the FCC approach argues that these
formulations are satisfied if the state commissions set the actual prices
for interconnection and unbundled access by applying the TELRIC
rules to particular circumstances." 4
The biggest obstacle to deriving FCC jurisdiction from the
references to "just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory" rates in § 251
is the "lack of parallelism" between § 252(c)(1) and (c)(2).181 As
Justice Breyer emphasized, § 252(c)(1) directs state commissions to
ensure compliance with the requirements of § 251, including any FCC
regulations promulgated under that section.' 6 In contrast, § 252(c)(2)
directs state commissions to set rates by following the pricing
standards set forth in § 252(d) and makes no reference to any FCC
unbundled access by virtue of § 251(c)(2)(D) and (c)(3) in conjunction with the
jurisdictional grant contained in (d)(1)). In other words, the jurisdictional equation for the
FCC approach is: § 251(d)(1) (directing the FCC to implement the requirements of § 251)
+ § 251(c)(2)(D), (c)(3) (obligating ILECs to provide interconnection and unbundled
access at "just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory" rates) = FCC pricing authority.
179. See Chen, supra note 92, at 79 (describing the "statutory command to set 'just and
reasonable rates' "as "ubiquitous").
180. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(D) (requiring ILECs to provide interconnection at
rates that are "just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory"), and 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3)
(requiring ILECs to provide access to unbundled network elements on terms that are
"just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory"), with 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994) (requiring that
"charges, practices, classifications ... for and in connection with [interstate or foreign]
communication service ... shall be just and reasonable"), and 47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1994)
(prohibiting common carriers from "unjust or unreasonable discrimination"). The FCC
noted the parallel between the old and new sections of the Communications Act. See First
Report & Order, supra note 7, 112, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15,558.
181. See 47 U.S.C. § 252(c)(1). Whether subsection (c)(1) obligates the state
commissions to follow FCC rate regulations is discussed below. See infra 185-94 and
accompanying text.
182. 47 U.S.C. § 252(c)(2).
183. Id. § 252(d)(1).
184. Cf AT&T, 525 U.S. at 384 (concluding that state commissions could satisfy the
requirements for setting rates by calculating the actual prices for interconnection and
unbundled access using the TELRIC methodology).
185. Id.; see also supra note 49 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 252(c)).
186. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 419 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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pricing regulations.1s7 Consequently, the lack of parallelism between
§ 252(c)(1) and (c)(2) appears to indicate that Congress did not
contemplate the existence of FCC pricing regulations under § 251.188
Justice Breyer's point is supported by two well-established
canons of statutory interpretation: expressio unius est exclusio
alterius89 and the rule that specific language trumps general
language.19° Here, expressio unius suggests that because Congress
referenced FCC regulations in § 252(c)(1), the failure to mention such
regulations in § 252(c)(2) means that the state commissions are not
bound to follow FCC regulations governing the pricing of
interconnection and unbundled access. Alternatively, one can argue
that § 252(c)(1) and (c)(2) contradict one another because the first
seems to require the states to follow FCC pricing rules while the
second does not. Under such an interpretation, the principle that
specific language trumps general language directs that § 252(c)(2)
should prevail because it speaks specifically to pricing while
187. See id. at 419-20 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also
supra note 49 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)).
188. Indeed, when the ratemaking language of § 251 is read in the light of its legislative
history, it arguably can be dismissed as legislative boilerplate that is given substantive
content only by the statutory pricing standard in § 252(d). See infra notes 228-32 and
accompanying text. This interpretation further weakens the FCC's claim to pricing
authority on the basis of § 251.
189. Expressio unius is "[a] canon of construction holding that to express or include
one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative." BLACK's LAW
DICIONARY 602 (7th ed. 1999). Some commentators have criticized expressio unius as an
unreliable principle of construction that should rarely if ever be used to decide a case. See
DICKERSON, supra note 146, at 234-35; see also Richard A. Posner, Statutory
Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CI. L. REV. 800, 805, 813
(1983) (discussing how scholars have dismissed this principle of statutory construction).
Others, however, have argued that expressio unius can be valuable if used with
appropriate caution. See David Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory
Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 927-29 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting
Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 455-56 (1989). The context of
§ 252(c)(1) and (c)(2) is an appropriate setting for an expressio unius argument, as one
reasonably can infer that Congress would have considered the possibility of making
reference to FCC regulations in subsection (c)(2). Cf. Sunstein, supra, at 456 (stating that
use of expressio unius is most appropriate "[w]hen it is plausible to assume that Congress
has considered all the alternatives"). Incidentally, Justice Scalia has used the logic of
expressio unius in deciding at least one statutory interpretation case. See Chan v. Korean
Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 130-33 (1989) ("[G]iven the parallel structures of these
provisions, it would be a flouting of the text to imply in Section I a sanction not only
withheld there but explicitly granted elsewhere. When such an interpretation is allowed,
the art of draftsmanship will have become obsolete.").
190. See, e.g., Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445 (1987)
(holding that "'where there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be
controlled or nullified by a general one' (quoting Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co.,
426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976))).
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§ 252(c)(1) deals with interconnection regulations in general.
Because § 252(c)(2) speaks specifically of rates and fails to mention
FCC regulations, the natural inference is that the "regulations"
referenced in subsection (c)(1) do not include pricing regulations.'91
The FCC approach has no answer to this lack of parallelism
problem,192 and hence runs afoul of the maxim that statutory
interpretations should attribute significance to every part of a
statute. 193 As a result, the FCC's contention that Congress required it
to establish a binding pricing methodology for the state commissions
through the language of § 251 is unconvincing. 94
The majority approach provides a stronger textual argument for
FCC pricing authority than the FCC approach because the majority
offers a fairly plausible account of the lack of parallelism in
§ 252(c).Y5 Instead of looking to § 251(d)(1), the majority upheld the
FCC's pricing jurisdiction based on the Commission's general
authority under § 201(b) to implement all the provisions of the
Communications Act of 1934 as amended, including those provisions
added by the 1996 Act. 96 According to this theory, the FCC may
choose to exercise its general authority by promulgating rules
interpreting the pricing standards in § 252,197 but is required by
191. 47 U.S.C. § 252(c); see AT&T, 525 U.S. at 420 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
192. The FCC ignored the lack of parallelism problem in its brief. See Opening Brief
for the Federal Petitioners, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999) (No. 97-
831).
193. See, e.g., United States Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc.,
508 U.S. 439, 455 (1993) (stating that "[sitatutory construction 'is a holistic endeavor,' and
at a minimum, must account for a statute's full text, language as well as punctuation,
structure, and subject matter" (quoting United Savings Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of
Linwood Forest Assocs. Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988))); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442
U.S. 330, 338-39 (1979) (stating that courts should give effect to every word Congress uses
whenever possible).
194. A variation on the FCC approach would treat § 251(d)(1) as a timetable rather
than a jurisdictional grant, but would follow the FCC approach by basing its claim to FCC
pricing authority on the references to "just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory" rates in
§ 251. This variation would fare no better in dealing with the lack of parallelism in § 252
than does the FCC approach. So long as one seeks to base the FCC's pricing authority on
the ratemaking language of § 251, the lack of parallelism difficulty is equally troublesome
whether one reads § 251(d)(1) as a timetable or as a jurisdictional grant. However, if the
majoritywas correct in contending that the ultimate source of FCC jurisdiction is § 201(b),
an alternative argument for FCC pricing authority is possible. See infra notes 195-223 and
accompanying text (discussing the majority's interpretive approach).
195. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 384-85.
196. See id at 377-78. In other words, the relevant jurisdictional equation is: § 201(b)
(granting the FCC general jurisdiction) + § 252(d)(1) (setting forth pricing standards for
interconnection and unbundled access) = FCC pricing authority.
197. See 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994) ("The Commissioner may prescribe such rules and
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§ 251(d)(1) to establish regulations implementing the requirements of
§ 251.198 The majority's approach claims that this contrast between
discretionary and mandatory rulemaking power explains the lack of
parallelism between §§ 252(c)(1) and 252(c)(2): "It seems to us not
peculiar that the mandated regulations should be specifically
referenced, whereas regulations permitted pursuant to the
Commission's § 201(b) authority are not." 99 To be fully convincing,
however, the majority approach must establish two things: (1) that
§ 201(b) gives the FCC general jurisdiction over local competition;
and (2) that this general jurisdiction is not displaced by the specific
language of § 252.
Commentators were surprised by the majority's treatment of
§ 201(b) as the source of FCC jurisdiction. Although Justice Scalia
concluded that § 201(b)'s plain meaning gives the FCC general
jurisdiction over local competition,' that claim is subject to two
potential objections, one based on appeals to legislative intent and a
second based on textual grounds.
The first objection derives from the maxim that statutory
interpretation seeks to discover the intent of the enacting
legislature.202 When § 201(b) was enacted in 1938, the substantive
scope of federal communications law did not extend to intrastate
matters; hence, at that time, Congress could not have understood
regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the provisions of this
[Act]." (emphasis added)).
198. See id. § 251(d)(1) (Supp. 11 1997) ("[T]he Commission shall complete all actions
necessary to establish regulations to implement the requirements of this section."
(emphasis added)).
199. AT&T, 525 U.S. at 385; see also id at 384-85 (stating that the lack of parallelism
between § 252(c)(1) and (c)(2) is "adequately explained by the fact that § 251 specifically
requires the Commission to promulgate regulations implementing that provision, whereas
subsection (d) of § 252 does not").
200. Two commentators who criticized the Eighth Circuit's decision did not recognize
the possibility that § 201(b) might determine the scope of FCC jurisdiction. See Chen,
supra note 92, at 68-76 (arguing that § 251(d)(1) is the source of the FCC's authority over
local telephone competition); McLaughlin, supra note 26, at 2248-49 (characterizing
§ 251(d)(1) as a broad grant of FCC authority over the Act's interconnection provisions).
201. The majority did not use the words "plain meaning," but Justice Scalia justified his
interpretation by saying that on his reading, § 201(b) "means what it says." AT&T, 525
U.S. at 378; see also 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (stating that the FCC "may prescribe such rules
and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the provisions of
this Act").
202. See, e.g., Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975) (stating that statutory
construction should aim to "ascertain the congressional intent and give effect to the
legislative will"); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414
U.S. 453, 458 (1974) (stating that "even the most basic general principles of statutory
construction must yield to clear contrary evidence of legislative intent").
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§ 201(b) to confer FCC jurisdiction over intrastate communications.
Furthermore, neither the statutory text nor the legislative history
indicate that Congress sought to change the meaning of § 201(b) by
passing the 1996 Act.2°3 These facts raise the question of whether the
majority's reading can be squared with the congressional intent
behind § 201(b).
The short answer is that the two cannot be reconciled, but that
this discrepancy is not a cause for alarm. The majority opinion
reflects the "textualism" of its author and, hence, does not engage in a
search for the subjective legislative intent behind § 201(b).204
Although Justice Scalia's textualism does not represent the thinking
of all the Justices who voted with him on the jurisdictional issues,20 5 it
203. One provision of the 1996 Act mentions § 201, but only to insist that nothing in
the new § 251 should be construed to limit the FCC's existing authority under § 201. See
47 U.S.C. § 251(i). The legislative history suggests that § 251(i) was included to clarify that
nothing in § 251 was intended to modify the FCC rules at 47 C.F.R. § 69.1-.502 (1999),
which govern interconnection and access charges between long-distance carriers and local
exchange carriers. See S. REP. No. 104-23, at 22 (1995) (Sup. Docs. No. Y1.1/5:104-23)
(discussing the Senate bill's proposed section 251(k), the predecessor of § 251(i) in the
final bill).
204. See Scalia, supra note 93, at 16-23 (criticizing the claim that discovering the
subjective intent of the legislature is the goal of statutory interpretation). For Justice
Scalia, the proper goal of statutory interpretation is "a sort of 'objectified' intent-the
intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the
remainder of the corpus furis." Id. at 17. The search for this objectified intent does not
require judges to consider legislative history. See id. at 29-37. Justice Scalia's "textualist"
philosophy of statutory interpretation has been widely discussed. See generally William N.
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 650-56, 666-90 (1990)
(explaining and critically analyzing Justice Scalia's textualism, but accepting textualist calls
for a "harder" plain meaning rule, increased use of interpretive canons, and greater
skepticism toward legislative history); William D. Popkin, An "Internal" Critique of Justice
Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1133, 1161-87 (1992)
(evaluating the possible justifications for Justice Scalia's "text- and rule-based approach to
statutory interpretation"); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New"
New Legal Process, 12 CARDOzo L. REV. 1597 passim (1991) (discussing Justice Scalia's
textualism in relation to the legal process theory of Henry Hart and Albert Sacks).
205. Justice Scalia's jurisdictional discussion was joined by Justices Stevens, Kennedy,
Souter, and Ginsburg. None of these Justices has been willing to join Justice Scalia in
categorically rejecting appeals to legislative history. See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism
and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 364 (1994) (writing before
Justice Ginsburg joined the court and noting that only Justice Thomas fully shares Justice
Scalia's textualist approach to statutory interpretation); see also United States v.
Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 51-54 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.) (relying on legislative history).
Professor Merrill observes that, whereas Justices Scalia and Thomas consistently refuse to
join any part of an opinion that appeals to legislative history, none of the Justices who
value legislative history consistently declines to join in textualist opinions. See id. at 365.
Thus, even when no Justice writes separately, one cannot assume that a vote for a result
favored by Justice Scalia necessarily implies full agreement with the reasoning by which he
reached that result.
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does explain how the majority was able to base the FCC's jurisdiction
over local telephone competition on § 201(b) without explicitly
addressing legislative intent.20 6
As Professor Eskridge has explained, Justice Scalia's approach to
statutory interpretation makes use of "horizontal" coherence
arguments, which emphasize the relationships between the text being
interpreted and the surrounding body of law. °  Justice Scalia
succinctly outlined his approach in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine
Co.,1°s arguing that courts should choose the interpretation that is "(1)
most in accord with context and ordinary usage, and thus most likely
to have been understood by the whole Congress ... (not to mention
the citizens subject to it), and (2) most compatible with the
surrounding body of law into which the provision must be
integrated."'2 9 According to Justice Scalia, judges should assume "by
a benign fiction" that Congress always drafts statutes with an eye
towards their compatibility with other laws.210
Justice Scalia's emphasis on horizontal coherence leaves him
open to the possibility that the meanings of statutes will change over
time as their relation to the surrounding statutory body changes.2 1
Accordingly, Justice Scalia's interpretive method required him to ask
neither what "provisions of this [Act]" meant to the 1938 Congress
nor whether the 1996 Congress subjectively intended the FCC's
jurisdiction over local telephone competition to spring from § 201(b).
Through the "benign fiction" that Congress knew the content of
206. Nontextualists still might locate the source of the FCC's jurisdiction in § 201(b).
For example, they might argue that the 1996 Act's effect on the statutory context changed
the denotation of the phrase "provisions of this [Act]" so that the phrase identifies a
different class of statutory sections than it did in 1938, while leaving the meaning of the
phrase unchanged. Cf. DICKERSON, supra note 146, at 125-321 (distinguishing between
the meaning/connotation and denotation of statutory language and arguing that the
connotations of statutory language should be fixed by the understanding of the
contemporary audience, but that the denotations of such language may properly be
allowed to change over time).
207. In contrast, "vertical" coherence arguments emphasize the relations between
statutory texts and the legislators who drafted them. See Eskridge, supra note 204, at 655.
208. 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
209. Ik at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
210. Id (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
211. See Eskridge, supra note 204, at 655, 667-68; see also Alexander T. Aleinikoff,
Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 20, 56-61 (1988) (rejecting
"originalist" approaches to statutory interpretation). Despite his well-known
"originalism" in constitutional interpretation, Justice Scalia also acknowledges that the
meaning of constitutional provisions can change as a result of amendments to other parts
of the Constitution. See Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION,
supra note 93, at 129, 141.
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§ 201(b) when it enacted the 1996 Act as an amendment to the 1934
Act, Justice Scalia could conclude that § 201(b) gives the FCC plenary
authority over all the provisions of the Act that do not explicitly
displace such authority-including §§ 251 and 252.212
The second objection to the majority's approach argues that
§ 201(b) cannot be read as a grant of general jurisdiction because it is
limited by its context to interstate or foreign communications.213
Subsection (a) of § 201 defines duties of carriers engaged in
"interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio. ' 214 The first
sentence of § 201(b) prohibits unjust or unreasonable "charges,
practices, classifications, and regulations for and in connection with
such communication service"215-a clear reference back to the
"interstate or foreign communications" addressed in § 201(a). After
three proviso clauses specifying Congress's view with respect to the
reasonableness of specific practices, § 201(b) concludes with the
apparently general language relied upon by Justice Scalia: "The
Commission may prescribe such rules and regulations as may be
necessary in the public interest to carry out the provisions of this
[Act]." 216 Thus, every sentence of § 201 other than the jurisdictional
grant in the last sentence of § 201(b) indisputably deals with interstate
or foreign communications. From a structural standpoint, the end of
§ 201 admittedly would be an odd place to locate a general grant of
jurisdiction over whatever the Communications Act might come to
include.2 17
In responding to this objection, the majority approach
emphasizes that the language of the jurisdictional grant in § 201(b) is
completely general, a fact that limiting interpretations cannot
ignore.218 The majority approach also finds indirect support in the
212. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 378.
213. See id. at 408 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that
the context of § 201(b) restricts its scope to jurisdiction over interstate or foreign
communications).
214. 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1994).
215. Id. § 201(b) (emphasis added).
216. Id.
217. Chief Justice Rehnquist raised this structural point in oral argument. See
Transcript of Oral Argument at *8, 1998 WL 729541, AT&T, 525 U.S. 366 (1999) (No. 97-
826).
218. But see AT&T, 525 U.S. at 408 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (invoking the principle of ejusdem generis to argue that the last sentence of § 201(b)
should be read as implicitly limited by its context to include only those provisions
governing interstate or foreign communications). Ejusdem generis is a canon of statutory
interpretation prescribing that "when a general word or phrase follows a list of specific
persons or things, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only persons
or things of the same type as those listed." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 535 (7th ed.
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language of §§ 251 and 252: while the Act clearly gives the FCC
authority over at least some aspects of local competition,219 the
language of those sections does not appear especially well-suited to
serve as the locus of that authority? Even § 251(d)(1), which
appears the most likely jurisdictional grant of any subsection within
the two provisions, can be read plausibly as a mere timetable for the
exercise of FCC authority.2' If §§ 251 and 252 do not contain a
jurisdictional grant, then, the FCC's authority over local competition
must originate in another provision-namely, § 201(b).m Finally, the
majority approach argues, in choosing to codify the 1996 Act as part
of the FCC's enabling statuteP Congress must have intended to give
the FCC broad authority of the sort contemplated in § 201(b).
The majority approach, then, has plausible responses to both
potential objections to its jurisdictional theory. Yet, even if the
majority is correct to treat § 201(b) as the source of general FCC
jurisdiction over local competition, the modified dissent approach
contends that the specific language of § 252 trumps the FCC's general
jurisdiction and reserves the pricing issue to the states. Deciding
between the majority and modified dissent approaches depends on
how each accounts for three features of §§ 251 and 252: (1) the
1999). For example, if a statute referred to "carrots, lettuce, and other plants," ejusdem
generls would caution against reading "other plants" to include redwood trees. The
principle seems ill suited to elucidate the meaning of § 201(b), however, because that
section is not structured as a list of specific jurisdictional grants followed by a general one.
219. See supra notes 158-76 and accompanying text (rejecting Justice Thomas's
approach and concluding that the FCC must have jurisdiction over at least the whole of
§ 251).
220. The individual subsections of § 251 that mention the FCC do not read like
jurisdictional grants, see supra notes 163-68 and accompanying text, and the pricing
provisions of § 252 do not mention the FCC at all. See 47 U.S.C. § 252(c)(2), (d)(1).
221. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 406 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Although the FCC approach treats § 251(d)(1) as a jurisdictional grant, other provisions of
the 1934 Act as amended arguably read more naturally as conferrals of FCC authority
than does § 251(d)(1). Compare 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(1) (Supp. III 1997) ("Within 6 months
after February 8, 1996, the Commission shall complete all actions . .. ."), with id. § 201(b)
("The Commission may prescribe such rules and regulations .. . ."), id. § 303(r) (1994)
(stating that the FCC may "[m]ake ... rules and regulations and prescribe ... restrictions
and conditions"), and id. § 154(i) (1994) (stating that the FCC may "perform ... acts,
make ... rules and regulations, and issue ... orders"). See supra notes 66, 154, 155 for
more extensive quotations of these provisions.
222. Or, if not through § 201(b), then by some other equally broad grant of FCC
jurisdiction. See supra note 66 (listing other provisions that might support general FCC
jurisdiction over the 1996 Act). Ultimately the force of this argument depends on whether
one regards § 251(d)(1) as a timetable or as jurisdictional grant-two choices that seem
equally plausible.
223. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 1(b), 110 Stat. 56, 56
(directing that the 1996 Act be codified as amending the Communications Act of 1934).
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language of § 252(c)(2) directing the states to "establish any rates" for
interconnection and unbundled access; (2) the references to "just,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory" rates in § 251; and (3) the lack of
parallelism between § 252(c)(1) and (c)(2).
The plain meaning of § 252(c)(2) slightly favors the modified
dissent approach.12 The provision directs the state commissions to
"establish any rates" according to the pricing standards in § 252(d)(1)
and says nothing about the FCC. Yet the majority approach has a
fairly convincing response. It points out that being required to follow
FCC pricing rules is compatible with establishing rates so long as the
state commissions determine specific prices by applying the TELRIC
methodology to particular circumstances. If the states can be said to
establish rates when they follow the statutory pricing standard in
§ 252(d)(1), the majority approach argues, they can also be said to
establish rates when they follow the FCC's TELRIC rules.z 6
Both the majority's approach and the modified dissent approach
deny that the FCC is required to promulgate a pricing methodology,
so both must explain away the references to "just, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory" rates in § 25L. Fortunately, both can argue
plausibly that the ratemaking language in § 251 can be dismissed as
legislative boilerplate.m Section 252(d) employs the language of "just
and reasonable rate[s]" in passing, requiring that state determinations
of the "just and reasonable rate" for interconnection and unbundled
access be "based on ... cost," be "nondiscriminatory," and "may
include a reasonable profit." 29 Significantly, the Conference Report
224. Cf Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 796 n.15 (8th Cir. 1997) (concluding that
"the FCC's belief that it has jurisdiction to issue local pricing rules conflicts with the plain
meaning of the Act"), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd.,
525 U.S. 366 (1999).
225. 47 U.S.C. § 252(c)(2).
226. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 384 (discussing 47 U.S.C. § 252(c)(2) and concluding that
state commissions establish rates when they apply the TELRIC rules to particular
circumstances); supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text; see also Opening Brief for the
Federal Petitioners at 26 n.9, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999) (No. 97-
831) (criticizing the Eighth Circuit for making the "negative inference" that "wherever
Congress assigned the state commissions some role in implementing the 1996 Act, it must
have intended for the [FCC] to play no role at all").
227. If the ratemaking language in § 251 authorizes the FCC to issue pricing rules that
would bind the state commissions, that pricing authority is mandatory because § 251(d)(1)
requires the FCC to establish regulations implementing that section.
228. Just as the FCC ignored the lack of parallelism between § 252(c)(1) and (c)(2), see
supra note 192 and accompanying text, the majority did not try to explain why Congress
included the references to "just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory" rates in § 251, see
AT&T, 525 U.S. at 371-97.
229. 47 U..S.C. § 252(d)(1); supra note 49 (quoting the provision).
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described the pricing standard established by § 252(d) as dictating
only that prices should be "based on cost" and "may include a
reasonable profit.' ' 3°  This summary suggests that the "just" and
"reasonable" requirements are boilerplate language lacking
substantive content?3 Furthermore, the pricing standard in § 252(d)
was drawn from Senate Bill 652, which did not require that prices be
"just" or "reasonable." 2 When the pricing language of the 1996 Act
is read in light of its legislative history, one might easily conclude that
the language of "just and reasonable rate[s]" is a mere placeholder
given substantive content only by the factors enumerated in
subsections (A) and (B) of § 252(d)(1).
The most critical issue is how to explain the lack of parallelism
between § 252(c)(1), which directs state commissions to ensure
compliance with the requirements of § 251 and any FCC regulations
promulgated under that section, and § 252(c)(2), which directs state
commissions to set rates by following the pricing standards set forth
in § 252(d) without reference to FCC regulations3 3 The majority
approach asserts that Congress included the reference to the FCC in
§ 252(c)(1) because the FCC is required to promulgate regulations to
implement § 251,21 but did not reference the FCC in § 252(c)(2)
because the Commission's rulemaking authority over the pricing
230. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 125 (1996) (Sup. Does. No. Yl.1/5:104-458),
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124,137.
231. The Conference Report's failure to mention "nondiscriminatory" as part of the
pricing standard is a bit odd because that requirement is given its own subsection in the
1996 Act. See 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1)(A)(ii). Perhaps the omission is explained by the fact
that the requirements dealing with cost and profit level can help the state commission to
derive numbers, whereas the standard of nondiscrimination serves not to generate prices,
but to rule out those prices that have discriminatory effects.
232. See S. 652, 104th Cong. § 101(a) (1995) (proposing section 251(d)(6)) (Sup. Docs.
No. Y1.4/1:104-652). The Senate Bill read:
(6) Charges.-If the amount charged by a local exchange carrier, or class of local
exchange carriers, for an unbundled element of the interconnection provided
under subsection (b) is determined by arbitration or intervention under this
subsection, then the charge-
(A) shall be
(i) based on the cost (determined without reference to a rate-of-return
or other rate-based proceeding) of providing the unbundled element,
(ii) nondiscriminatory, and
(iii) individually priced to the smallest element that is technically and
economically reasonable to provide; and
(B) may include a reasonable profit.
Id.
233. 47 U.S.C. § 252(c); see also supra note 49 (quoting the statute).
234. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(1) ("[T]he Commission shall complete all actions necessary
to establish regulations to implement the requirements of this section." (emphasis
added)).
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standards in § 252(d)(1) is discretionary35  The modified dissent
approach takes the lack of parallelism in § 252(c) at face value,
concluding that pricing jurisdiction is reserved to the states.
The modified dissent approach's solution to the lack of
parallelism problem is slightly more plausible than the majority
approach's for two reasons. First, the language of § 252(c)(2) more
easily bears the interpretation proposed by the modified dissent
approach. This claim can be demonstrated through the standard
interpretive technique of redrafting disputed language to require a
result in favor of each party and then asking which "redraft" is closer
to the original language? 6 Imagine that the statutory language had
required the state commissions to establish rates "solely according to
subsection (d)." With the addition of the one word "solely," the
statute would require the interpretation proposed by the modified
dissent approach. In contrast, only language requiring the state
commissions to "establish any rates according to subsection (d),
including any regulations the Commission might promulgate in
relation to that subsection" would compel the majority's
interpretation. The second "redraft" of the statute seems a far
greater stretch than the first; therefore, § 252(c)(2) is read most
naturally to support state pricing authority.
Second, the modified dissent approach is more plausible than the
majority approach because the statutory context suggests that
Congress would not intentionally have committed the question of
pricing jurisdiction to the FCC's discretion. The 1996 Act includes
many provisions designed to draw clear boundaries between federal
and state authority. For example, Congress required the FCC to
establish regulations implementing § 251, but allowed the states to
impose additional interconnection and access obligations on carriers
so long as those obligations do not conflict with federal
requirements. 7  Similarly, Congress granted the FCC broad
preemption power in § 253(d), but explicitly exempted certain state
functions from that power. 8 These provisions suggest that Congress
sought to define explicitly the scope of the FCC's authority over the
235. See id. § 201(b) (1994) ("The Commissioner may prescribe such rules and
regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the provisions of this
[Act]." (emphasis added)).
236. Cf. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACrs 502-03 (2d ed. 1990) (describing the
application of this technique in contract interpretation).
237. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(1), (d)(3).
238. See id § 253(b)-(d); see also supra note 140 (describing the Senate's attention to
federalism issues in debating the scope of the FCC's preemption power under the Act).
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states and likely would not have left the FCC discretion over the
range of pricing autonomy that the states would enjoy. In the context
of the 1996 Act as a whole, then, the lack of parallelism between
§ 252(c)(1) and (c)(2) is best explained as an affirmation of state
authority.
The textual analysis of the jurisdictional issues in AT&T can be
summarized as follows. Each of the approaches considered leaves
significant interpretive anomalies. In attempting to limit FCC
jurisdiction to those subsections of § 251 that explicitly mention the
FCC, Justice Thomas's approach is unable to explain the language
and structure of § 251. The FCC approach, which would base the
FCC's authority to issue TELRIC on the ratemaking language of
§ 251, fails to offer any explanation of the lack of parallelism between
§§ 252(c)(1) and 252(c)(2). Both the majority approach and the
modified dissent approach must discount the ratemaking language in
§ 251 to be fully plausible.?39 Although the majority approach
provides the strongest case for FCC pricing authority, the modified
dissent approach offers the best overall account of the statutory text
because it provides the most convincing explanation for the lack of
parallelism between § 252(c)(1) and (c)(2).
This Note contends, then, that although none of the interpretive
strategies considered are fully satisfactory, purely textual analysis
slightly favors the modified dissent approach. In other words, a Court
that faithfully followed Justice Scalia's textualist method of
interpretation should have concluded that the state commissions
retain pricing authority under the 1996 Act. But the margin of victory
for the modified dissent approach is narrow indeed and does not
dispel the suspicion that Congress never fully faced and decided the
question whether the FCC has the authority to guide state
interpretations of the pricing standards in § 252(d)(1). This Note will
now consider whether the use of "tie-breaking" interpretive
principles might provide a more satisfactory resolution of the pricing
jurisdiction issue in AT&T.
When legislative intent is ambiguous (or nonexistentm), courts
sometimes resolve questions of statutory interpretation by resort to
"substantiver241 "procedural"2 42 interpretive canons that tip the
239. Both of these approaches are more convincing than the FCC approach because it
is easier to explain away the ratemaking language in § 251 than to explain away the lack of
parallelism in § 252(c).
240. Cf. Scalia, supra note 93, at 32 (stating that "with respect to 99.9 percent of the
issues of construction reaching the courts, there is no legislative intent").
241. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
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balance toward one outcome or another.243 As the Supreme Court
has become less willing to use legislative history to resolve the
meaning of ambiguous texts, interpretive norms have become even
more important.2' Three such norms are relevant to whether the
FCC has pricing authority. The first is provided by 47 U.S.C.
§ 152(b), the 1934 Act provision that has been interpreted as creating
a barrier to FCC jurisdiction over intrastate matters that can be
overcome only by a clear statement of congressional intent.245
Because of § 152(b), the Act carries a set of interpretive instructions
that might be used to resolve issues about the federal-state balance of
power in telecommunications law.246 The second interpretive canon
that might bear on AT&T is the presumption against finding federal
preemption in areas in which the states have traditionally exercised
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 595 (1992) (defining
substantive canons as interpretive norms that reflect values drawn from the Constitution,
federal statutory law, and common law). In using substantive canons, the courts assume
that in the absence of some contrary signal, Congress intends to respect certain general
policies-such as federalism and the availability of judicial review-in its legislation. See
id. at 595, 597, 601. Substantive canons typically take the form of either "presumptions"
or "clear statement rules." Id. at 595 & n.4. Presumptions can be rebutted by arguments
from statutory text, purpose, or legislative history, whereas clear statement rules can be
rebutted only by explicit statutory language. See id. at 595 n.4. Supreme Court Justices
have discussed the distinction between presumptions and clear statement rules in Astoria
Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1991), and EEOC
v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,260-63 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
242. A "procedural" canon often directs the courts to defer to the authority of other
decisionmakers. See Eskridge, supra note 204, at 664. The Chevron doctrine of deference
to administrative agencies is by far the most important procedural canon for the textualists
on the Supreme Court. See id. at 665. For a different typology of interpretive norms
based on their functions, see Sunstein, supra note 189, at 454-60.
243. The so-called "linguistic" canons of interpretation, such as expressio unius and
ejusdem generis, are a part of the effort to determine the meaning of a statutory text. See
Shapiro, supra note 189, at 927. The linguistic canons are distinct from substantive canons
because they do not rest on potentially controversial assumptions about Congress's policy
preferences. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 241, at 595-96.
244. See Eskridge, supra note 204, at 656-60, 663-64 (discussing how the influence of
textualism has led the Court to rely less on legislative history and more on interpretative
canons). Note, however, that at least in Justice Scalia's case, textualism also means that
fewer statutes are judged to be genuinely ambiguous. See id. at 658 n.144 (stating that
Justice Scalia finds few texts ambiguous); Scalia, supra note 60, at 521 (acknowledging that
textualists will find statutes to be ambiguous under step one of Chevron far less frequently
than those who are willing to consult legislative history).
245. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1994); supra note 105 (quoting § 152(b)); see also infra notes
249-69 (discussing the application of § 152(b) to the pricing jurisdiction issue in AT&T).
Although § 152(b) functions like a clear statement rule, it is not technically a substantive
canon because it does not reflect a policy assumption adopted by the Court. Instead, it is
an interpretive instruction from Congress contained within the statute itself.
246. For a discussion of interpretive instructions, see Sunstein, supra note 189, at 456-
57.
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their police powers. 47 Both of these standards tilt close interpretive
questions in favor of the states and would preclude the FCC's pricing
jurisdiction in AT&T. A third interpretive norm, deference to
administrative agencies, would counsel a decision in favor of the FCC,
but is conspicuously absent from the jurisdictional discussion in
AT&T.24
Since Louisiana PSC,2 49 § 152(b) has operated as a " 'super-
strong clear statement rule'" that requires extremely explicit textual
evidence to change the interpretive outcome from the default setting
of state authority over intrastate communications250 Because the
FCC's authority to issue its TELRIC rules is hardly "straightforward"
or "unambiguous,"2' § 152(b) would preserve state pricing authority
if it controls the pricing jurisdiction issue. The statute's application
depends on the significance of its disjunctive language, requiring that
"nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply or give the
Commission jurisdiction with respect to" various intrastate matters,
including, most importantly, charges 5 2 That language, considered in
isolation, might seem to support Justice Thomas's contention that to
give the FCC jurisdiction over intrastate matters, Congress first must
indicate unambiguously that a law "applies" to intrastate matters and
then unambiguously indicate that the FCC has authority to make
rules implementing that law. s
Both the historical context of § 152(b) and the Court's decision
in Louisiana PSC, however, militate against this conclusion. As
reviewed by the Court in Louisiana PSC, the legislative history of
the Communications Act of 1934 indicates that § 152(b) was written
247. See Rice Elevator v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see also
infra notes 270-89 (discussing the application of the Rice presumption to the pricing
jurisdiction issue in AT&T).
248. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-44 (1984) (outlining the norm); see also infra notes 290-304 (discussing the application
of Chevron to the pricing jurisdiction issue in AT&T). Scholars have asked whether the
Chevron norm should prevail or give way when it conflicts with congressional interpretive
instructions or substantive canons such as that announced in Rice. See McGreal, supra
note 122, -at 844-87; Sunstein, supra note 60, at 2108-19. The Court decided AT&T
without addressing such issues.
249. 476 U.S. 355, 377 (1986) (requiring "straightforward" and "unambiguous"
language to overcome the limits on FCC jurisdiction imposed by 47 U.S.C. § 152(b)); see
supra notes 117-27.
250. Chen, supra note 92, at 83 (quoting Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 241, at 615).
251. Louisiana PSC, 476 U.S. at 377.
252. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
253. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 409 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
254. See Louisiana PSC, 476 U.S. at 372-73; see also supra notes 102-06 and
accompanying text (discussing the origins of § 152(b)).
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in reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in the Shreveport Rate
Cases,5  which granted the Interstate Commerce Commission
ancillary jurisdiction over intrastate railroad shipping rates. Section
152(b), then, was intended to limit the FCC's ability to regulate
intrastate communications solely because of their effects on interstate
communication 5 6 Thus, the legislative history behind § 152(b)
strongly supports the Court's contention that the disjunctive language
of § 152(b) is intended to distinguish between the FCC's primary and
ancillary jurisdiction- 5
Further reflection on the historical context also supports the
majority's interpretation of § 152(b). Because the language of
§ 152(b) limits the FCC, the meaning of that language can be clarified
by asking what evils Congress sought to prevent. On the majority's
interpretation, the disjunctive language guards against bold assertions
of ancillary jurisdiction of the sort sanctioned by the Shreveport Rate
Cases.-8 If the legislative history is any guide, Congress was
preoccupied with this specific danger when it drafted § 152(b). 59 In
contrast, Justice Thomas's interpretation of § 152(b) apparently
would treat the disjunctive language as prompted by a desire to
clarify that even if extensions in federal communications law were
intended to apply to intrastate charges, the FCC would still lack
jurisdiction over such intrastate matters absent an explicit grant of
authority. Neither the legislative history nor the historical context
indicate that Congress was concerned about preemptively settling an
interpretive issue that did not materialize until the passage of the
1996 Act.2- ° Most likely, the 1938 Congress never considered the
precise issue in AT&T: whether FCC jurisdiction follows as a matter
of course when federal communications law has been extended to
apply directly to intrastate charges.
Although the Louisiana PSC Court did not explicitly parse the
two sides of § 152(b)'s disjunction as respectively addressing primary
and ancillary FCC jurisdiction, its analysis also is consistent with the
majority position in AT&T. 61 In Louisiana PSC, the FCC claimed
authority to regulate the method of calculating depreciation rates on
255. Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States ("Shreveport Rate Cases"), 234 U.S.
342 (1914). For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
256. See Louisiana PSC, 476 U.S. at 372-73 (citing McKenna, supra note 103, at 2).
257. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 380-81.
258. Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. at 357-60.
259. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
261. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 381 (discussing Louisiana PSC).
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local telephone equipment for purposes of intrastate ratemaking.262
The FCC's principal argument was that 47 U.S.C. § 220(b) provided
direct authorization for the regulation of local depreciation
methods.26 In other words, it claimed that § 220(b) "applied" to
those methods. The Court rejected this argument, stating that the
language of § 220(b) was not sufficiently "straightforward or
unambiguous" to overcome the rule of statutory construction
articulated in § 152(b). 4 The FCC also asserted ancillary jurisdiction
based on the effects of local depreciation practices on the interstate
sphere.2  The Court, however, found that such jurisdiction was
barred by § 152(b).?6 Thus, Louisiana PSC supports, but does not
necessitate, the AT&T majority's reading of § 152(b). As with the
legislative history of § 152(b), Louisiana PSC simply does not speak
to the question of whether a federal communications statute that
directly "applies" to intrastate charges requires an additional explicit
grant of jurisdiction to the FCC.267
Given that the statutory text, legislative history, and case law did
not require the Court to view the scope of FCC jurisdiction under the
1996 Act through the lens of § 152(b), the AT&T majority was
justified in its treatment of the provision. Section 152(b) has been
criticized widely as an anachronism that ignores the realities of
modem telephone communications, so courts should refuse to expand
its impact unnecessarily. When a statutory text clearly "applies" to
262. See Louisiana PSC, 476 U.S. at 364-68; supra notes 119-26 and accompanying
text.
263. See Louisiana PSC, 476 U.S. at 366 (discussing 47 U.S.C. § 220(b) (1994)).
264. Id. at 377.
265. Id. at 362.
266. See id. at 374-75.
267. Thus, Justice Breyer was mistaken when he argued that Louisiana PSC was
inconsistent with the majority's jurisdictional holdings in AT&T. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at
381 n.7 (criticizing Justice Breyer's use of Louisiana PSC, id. at 421 (Breyer, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part)). In the latter case, all the parties agreed that the relevant
statutory sections apply to intrastate matters. See id.
268. See, e.g., KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 97, §§ 2.7-2.7.3, at 85-91. The majority
narrowed the force of § 152(b) by stating that the section has no application to cases in
which a statute clearly "applies" to intrastate telecommunications. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at
380. Other commentators have suggested that courts should limit the effect of § 152(b) by
interpreting the "charges" statutorily reserved to the states' jurisdiction to include only the
rates paid by retail customers. See Galst, supra note 122, at 145 (arguing that § 152(b) was
intended to preserve state control only over the rates charged to retail customers for local
phone service); McLaughlin, supra note 26, at 2250-51 (arguing that a judicial re-
interpretation tying "charges" to retail communications rates would help resolve the
jurisdictional conflicts created by the 1996 Act). Under such an approach, § 152(b) would
not speak to the question of pricing authority in AT&T because the "charges" at issue
concern only the rates ILECs can charge CLECs for inputs used in providing retail service
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intrastate communications, courts do not need to scan the text for an
additional "clear statement" of FCC jurisdiction.269  The 1996 Act
should be read to give the FCC no less authority than a reasonable
construction of the Act will yield.
A second interpretive principle-the "'presumption against the
pre-emption of state police power regulation' "-would tend to favor
the retention of state ratemaking authority?2T0  Justice Breyer
advanced this argument in AT&T based on Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp.27 1 and Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,r2 two cases that
examined the preemptive effects of federal statutes.273 Justice Breyer
urged that statutes preempting state police power regulations should
be read with "the assumption that Congress intended to preserve
[state] authority," 4 but this appeal to the Rice presumption is
unconvincing within the context of AT&T for several reasons.
First, AT&T is a case about jurisdiction, whereas Rice and
Cipollone were cases about the scope of federal preemption. The
principal issue in AT&T is whether the FCC has the authority to issue
pricing regulations, not whether or to what extent its pricing
regulations have preemptive effect. If the FCC has jurisdiction over
pricing, its TELRIC rules clearly preempt inconsistent state pricing
rules by virtue of the Supremacy Clause.275 In contrast, the real issue
in Rice and Cipollone was the extent to which admittedly
authoritative exercises of federal power preempted state law.2 76
Furthermore, both Rice and Cipollone involved claims of "field
to customers. Nothing in the 1996 Act suggests that the FCC may regulate retail rates for
local telephone service.
269. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 381-82.
270. Id at 420 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,518 (1992)).
271. 331 U.S. 218,230 (1947).
272. 505 U.S. 504,518 (1992).
273. In Rice, the issue was whether a federal statute regulating grain warehouses
superceded state regulation in the same field. 331 U.S. at 229. In Cipollone, the issue was
whether federal legislation governing cigarette packaging and advertising preempted
certain state common-law remedies for damages caused by cigarette smoking. 505 U.S. at
509-13.
274. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 420 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
275. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Federal regulations are federal laws for purposes of
the Supremacy Clause and, hence, trump any conflicting state laws or regulations. See
Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,152-53 (1982).
276. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516-17; Rice, 331 U.S. at 229-31. One also might
criticize Justice Breyer's use of statutory preemption cases such as Rice and Cipollone to
analyze the regulatory preemption issues in AT&T. See McGreal, supra note 122, at 826-
29 (criticizing the Supreme Court for uncritically importing statutory preemption rules
into its regulatory preemption jurisprudence).
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preemption," in which a federal regulatory scheme completely
displaces an entire area of state law.27 In contrast, the FCC's pricing
rules-if valid-would preempt only those state pricing regulations
that directly conflict with TELRIC.278 Such "conflict preemption" 279
raises far less serious federalism concerns than field preemption and,
therefore, may not merit the same interpretive treatment.280 As an
initial matter, then, the circumstances in AT&T are sufficiently
distinct from those in Rice and Cipollone to suggest that the issue of
the FCC's pricing authority is not governed by the Rice presumption
against federal preemption of state police power regulations.
Yet, even if AT&T is distinguishable from Rice and Cipollone,
some might argue that the general principles of "political process
federalism" that support the Rice presumption required the Court to
construe ambiguities in statutory authority against the FCC. 1 The
basic theme of political process federalism is that the states must look
primarily to the political process for protection from unwanted
federal intrusions on their sovereignty, and that the courts have an
277. See McGreal, supra note 122, at 835-37 (discussing field preemption).
278. In fact, the 1996 Act explicitly leaves room for supplementary state regulation
regarding interconnection. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(3) (Supp. III 1997) (barring the FCC
from precluding state "access and interconnection" regulations that neither conflict with
nor prevent the implementation of the FCC's rules).
279. See McGreal, supra note 122, at 832-34 (discussing conflict preemption).
280. See Jack W. Campbell IV, Regulatory Preemption in the Garcia/Chevron Era, 59
U. Prrr. L. REv. 805, 813-15 (1998). Indeed, Campbell persuasively argues that so-called
"conflict preemption" is not properly a form of "preemption" at all and instead should be
described as "supremacy." Id. at 814-15 (citing Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of
Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 767, 784 (1994)). According to Campbell, genuine
preemption is " 'more subtle, and more powerful, than simple operation of the Supremacy
Clause. Preemption rests on the idea of (for lack of a better term) a "preemptive strike"
against state laws before they conflict with federal law.'" Id. at 814 n.51 (quoting Paul
Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 69, 88
(1988)). Campbell and Gardbaum argue that genuine preemption rests not on the
Supremacy Clause, but on the Necessary and Proper Clause. See id. at 813 (citing U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18).
281. The phrase "political process federalism" is taken from Campbell, supra note 280,
at 806. Professor Tribe has argued that the presumption against preemption furthers the
Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence "by requiring that decisions restricting state
sovereignty be made in a deliberate manner by Congress.... [T]o give the state-displacing
weight of federal law to mere congressional ambiguity would evade the very procedure for
lawmaking on which [the Court has] relied to protect states' interests." LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrTuTIONAL LAW § 6-26, at 480 (2d ed. 1988).
282. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), the
Court stated that "the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the
States in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself." Id. at
550. Although the teaching of Garcia on this point has been limited somewhat by the
Court's decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,551 (1995) (holding that the Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1944), exceeded Congress's authority
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important role to play in preserving the integrity of that political
process. Through the use of "clear statement" rules and
presumptions of statutory interpretation, courts can require Congress
to deliberate about and explicitly embrace the federalism implications
of new legislation.m These interpretive principles foster political
accountability by ensuring that Congress cannot sidestep federalism
issues by passing ambiguous statutes and then allowing courts or
executive agencies to take the political heat for making unpopular
choices that increase federal power.& In effect, the Court holds
Congress's feet to the fire by insisting that significant shifts in the
federal-state balance of power be made by Congress alone.
Political process federalism might seem to require a decision in
favor of the state commissions because recognizing FCC pricing
authority would shift the federal-state balance of power, and the text
and legislative history of the 1996 Act suggest that Congress was not
completely accountable for that shift. Nonetheless, concluding that
political process federalism requires a decision in favor of the states
would be premature. At the very least, there must be some threshold
level below which the federalism implications of congressional action
are too slight to trigger the concerns of political process federalism.
under the Commerce Clause), the political process remains the primary mechanism for
vindication of state sovereignty interests. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (stating that the responsibility for monitoring the balance of power between
federal and state interests falls primarily on the political branches of government).
283. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991) ("[I]nasmuch as this Court in
Garcia has left primarily to the political process the protection of the States against
intrusive exercises of Congress' Commerce Clause powers, we must be absolutely certain
that Congress intended such an exercise."); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 241, at 630-31
(arguing that clear statement rules and presumptions give meaning to underenforced
constitutional norms such as federalism and help to assure that important policy choices
are made by the political branches). Eskridge and Frickey argue that with the Rehnquist
Court's increasing use of clear statement rules, "'quasi-constitutional law,' the reading
into statutes of constitutional values subject only to clear legislative override, has replaced
constitutional law, the invalidation of federal statutes, as the way in which the Court is
enforcing 'our federalism.'" Id. at 612.
284. On the congressional proclivity for ducking difficult decisions, see 122 CONG.
REC. 31,622 (1976) (statement by Rep. Flowers) ("Congress pass[es] myriad laws and ...
invest[s] ... agencies with ... vast power to make rules and regulations, and then ...
stand[s] back and say[s] when.., constituents are aggrieved or oppressed by various rules
and regulations, 'Hey, it's not me. We didn't mean that.' "); see also Carl McGowan,
Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1119, 1130 n.42
(1977) (quoting this statement).
285. See supra note 129-50 and accompanying text (suggesting that the legislative
history of the Act provides no conclusive evidence of congressional intent on the issue of
pricing authority); supra note 151-239 and accompanying text (suggesting that the text of
the Act provides no conclusive evidence of congressional intent on the issue of pricing
authority).
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Consider, for example, that every federal regulation has the potential
to displace inconsistent state laws by virtue of the Supremacy Clause
and, thus, the potential to alter the balance of power between the
federal government and the states. Yet, to require explicit
congressional deliberation on the federalism implications of every
agency action would be absurd.2 6 As one commentator noted, "[i]f
courts required Congress to sanction clearly each exercise of agency
authority that might conflict with extant state law, creation of the
agency obviously would be a colossal waste of time."''
While the FCC's authority to issue TELRIC was important
enough to prompt vigorous litigation by the state utility commissions,
it may fall below the threshold at which the Court should require
clear statements of congressional intent in the interests of political
process federalism. The issue in AT&T, after all, was not whether the
state utility commissions could set prices in any way they choose?3m
Rather, the issue was whether a state's discretion in setting rates
within the new federal arbitration scheme was to be limited by the
FCC's pricing rules in addition to the statutory pricing standard.
Although Congress did not squarely shoulder the responsibility for
that further limitation, the additional burden on state sovereignty is
comparatively small. As the Court observed, the jurisdictional debate
in AT&T was "not about whether the States will be allowed to do
their own thing, but about whether it will be the FCC or the federal
courts that draw the lines to which they must hew." 289 Although there
is some room for debate on the question, the Court probably was
286. Justice Breyer's attempt to interpret the 1996 Act in light of the Rice presumption
leads to absurd consequences if carried to its logical conclusion. Under Justice Breyer's
analysis, whenever a federal agency action preempts any state law or regulation-at least
in areas in which the state traditionally has exercised its police powers-aggrieved parties
could argue that the agency lacked jurisdiction to take the disputed action, absent clear
evidence of congressional intent to preempt the relevant state law. Needless to say, such
preemptive intent would rarely, if ever, be found. Justice Breyer likely would argue that,
as applied to the circumstances in AT&T, a "clear and manifest" conferral of jurisdiction
would be enough. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). But that is
not what the Rice presumption requires. As noted above, intent to confer jurisdiction and
intent to preempt are not the same. See supra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
287. Campbell, supra note 280, at 822.
288. The statute explicitly requires the state utility commissions to follow the pricing
standards contained in § 252(d)(1) and makes their decisions subject to review in federal
district court. See 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1), (e)(6) (Supp. III 1997). Congress spelled out
these significant incursions of federal power on traditional state authority with
considerable clarity.
289. AT&T, 525 U.S. at 379 n.6. The Court acknowledged that the FCC might
circumscribe state pricing autonomy more closely than the courts, but thought that the
difference was too minor "to spark a passionate 'States' rights' debate." Id.
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correct in concluding that, when considered in the context of the 1996
Act, the issue of pricing authority does not raise federalism concerns
sufficient to justify applying the interpretive strategies of political
process federalism.
Unlike the first two interpretive principles considered, the
Chevron doctrine of deference to reasonable agency interpretations
would favor the FCC's claims to pricing authority.2 0 Rather
curiously, however, Chevron apparently played no role in the
majority's treatment of the jurisdictional issues in AT&T.29 x Perhaps
the Court failed to cite Chevron because it found no ambiguity in the
statutes relevant to the FCC's jurisdictional claims.29 This Note has
argued, however, that the relevant texts do not yield a clear
resolution of the pricing jurisdiction issue.293 The textual ambiguities
raise the question whether the Court might properly have resolved
the issue of FCC pricing authority by invoking the Chevron doctrine.
The answer hinges on whether the FCC is entitled to judicial
deference when interpreting the scope of its statutory jurisdiction.
Justice Scalia has stated explicitly that Chevron deference should
extend to an agency's jurisdictional interpretations.294 The Court as a
whole, however, has never explicitly settled this question,295 and
290. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-44 (1984); see also supra note 60 (discussing Chevron).
291. The majority, however, did mention Chevron in summing up its treatment of the
entire case. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 397. After noting that some of the FCC's
interpretations of the 1996 Act favored the Commission's interests over state interests and
CLEC interests over ILEC interests, the Court cited Chevron for the proposition that
"Congress is well aware that the ambiguities it chooses to produce in a statute Will be
resolved by the implementing agency." Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43). This
statement might be read as evidence that the Court would have deferred to the FCC's
reasonable claims of jurisdiction had it found the jurisdictional language of the statute
ambiguous.
292. See id. at 378 (recognizing broad FCC jurisdiction because § 201(b) "means what
it says"). Professor Merrill argues that the rise of textualism on the Supreme Court has
sapped the Chevron doctrine of some of its vitality, as textualist judges increasingly choose
to resolve difficult interpretive questions on the basis of their own judgments about what
the statutory text means. See Merrill, supra note 205, at 366-73.
293. See supra notes 151-239 and accompanying text.
294. See Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex reL Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 381
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[I]t is settled law that the rule of
deference applies even to an agency's interpretation of its own statutory authority or
jurisdiction." (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 844-45
(1986); NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 830 n.7 (1984))). But see id. at 387
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that "this Court has never deferred to an agency's
interpretation of a statute designed to confine the scope of its jurisdiction").
295. See Quincy M. Crawford, Comment, Chevron Deference to Agency Interpretations
That Delimit the Scope of the Agency's Jurisdiction, 61 U. Ci9. L. REV. 957, 961 (1994)
(citing Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 54-55 (1990) (White, J.,
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scholarly commentary is divided on the issue.2 96 Commentators who
endorse Justice Scalia's position generally emphasize the difficulty of
separating jurisdictional from non-jurisdictional questions. 9  In
contrast, opponents of this position insist that in certain cases the
distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional issues is
fairly clear and that, with respect to jurisdictional issues, concerns
about agency self-dealing militate against the application of Chevron
deference.2 98
The better view appears to be that Chevron should not apply to
jurisdictional questions. Admittedly, the question of who should have
authority to promulgate pricing rules is a policy question-arguably a
policy question in which the FCC has even greater expertise than
Congress.2 9 Nevertheless, whatever policy edge the FCC might have
in deciding that question is offset by concerns that the Commission's
judgments regarding its own jurisdiction might be biased by self-
interest.3° As Professor Sunstein writes, "courts should not permit
dissenting)).
296. Compare id. at 968-76 (arguing that Chevron applies to jurisdictional questions
primarily because there is no principled way to separate jurisdictional from non-
jurisdictional issues), with Sunstein, supra note 60, at 2097-2101 (arguing that, at least to
the extent that jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional questions can be separated, courts
should not defer to agency interpretations of their own jurisdiction because Congress
would be unlikely to have intended for agencies to be "judges in their own cause"), and
Eric M. Braun, Note, Coring the Seedless Grape: A Reinterpretation of Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. NRDC, 87 COLUM. L. RuV. 986, 1005-07 (1987) (arguing that little deference
should be given to agency interpretations of their own jurisdiction because of the dangers
of "agency aggrandizement").
297. See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 295, at 968-76. Crawford has noted that in most
cases, jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional questions are mixed inextricably. See id. at 975.
For example, the FCC's authority to define what counts as a network element for
purposes of 47 U.S.C. § 153(29) (Supp. III 1997) was accorded deference by the Supreme
Court. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 387. Yet, the interpretation of network element also affects
the scope of the agency's jurisdiction because the FCC only can order the unbundling of
items that meet the definition of network element. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (Supp. III
1997). If there could be no deference on any question that affected the agency's
jurisdiction, Chevron would become a dead letter. See Crawford, supra note 295, at 975.
298. See Sunstein, supra note 60, at 2097-2101; see also Merrill, supra note 60, at 1024-
25 (arguing that under his proposed "executive precedent" model, a lesser degree of
deference may be owed to an agency's interpretations of its own jurisdiction). Professor
Merrill argues that Chevron is not consistently followed by the Supreme Court and that a
multi-factor, "executive precedent" model for deciding when to defer to agency
interpretations would afford both a better description of the Court's practice and a more
normatively satisfying view. See Merrill, supra note 60, at 980-1033.
299. In the First Report and Order, the FCC discussed the pros and cons of adopting a
national approach to pricing instead of leaving pricing decisions wholly in the hands of the
states. See First Report & Order, supra note 7, [ 105, 109-11, 113-14, 11 F.C.C.R. at
15,553,15,555-59.
300. See Braun, supra note 296, at 1005 (citing Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc.,
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foxes to guard henhouses." 0' Moreover, to the extent that the
Chevron doctrine is justified as an attempt to follow congressional
instructions about who should have the power to resolve statutory
ambiguities, it seems implausible to assume that Congress would want
jurisdictional ambiguities to be resolved by parties with direct
interests in the outcomes.s0 2 Not every statutory ambiguity represents
a congressional decision to delegate interpretive authority to
agencies? 3 Because Congress was unlikely to have left the issue of
pricing jurisdiction in the FCC's hands,3°4 the Chevron doctrine
should not be used to resolve that issue.
Thus, it appears that despite the majority's confident resolution
of the case on textual grounds, neither the text and legislative history
of the 1996 Act nor established interpretive principles compel that
result. Indeed, textual analysis slightly favors the conclusion that the
state commissions should be free to develop their own pricing
methodologies under the 1996 Act. Nevertheless, the Court's
decision becomes more understandable and defensible if one
interprets the Act in the light of public policy considerations. This
322 U.S. 607, 616 (1944)).
301. Sunstein, supra note 189, at 470.
302. Professor Sunstein views Chevron as "an attempted reconstruction of
congressional instructions ... that is responsive to the comparative advantages of the
agency in administering complex statutes." Sunstein, supra note 60, at 2101. Accordingly,
he would not apply Chevron "when the best reconstruction argues against deference." Id.
He emphasizes that "[i]ndependent judicial assessments are.. . appropriate in... contexts
involving predictable bias, most notably jurisdictional determinations." IM
For Justice Scalia, on the other hand, Chevron is not an attempt to reconstruct
congressional intent at all. See Scalia, supra note 60, at 517. Instead, Chevron functions
"principally as a background rule of law against which Congress can legislate.... Congress
now knows that the ambiguities it creates, whether intentionally or unintentionally, will be
resolved ... not by the courts but by a particular agency, whose policy biases will
ordinarily be known." Id.; see also AT&T, 525 U.S. at 397 ("Congress is well aware that
the ambiguities it chooses to produce in a statute will be resolved by the implementing
agency."). Perhaps Justice Scalia is willing to defer to an agency's reasonable
interpretations of its own jurisdiction in part because he differs from Sunstein about the
rationale behind Chevron. But see Crawford, supra note 295, at 977-82 (arguing that
deference to agencies'-interpretations of their own jurisdiction is appropriate regardless of
the rationale behind the Chevron doctrine). While Justice Scalia's understanding of
Chevron promises the greater predictability of a bright-line rule, the question remains as
to where the Court gets the authority to adopt such a bright-line rule even in cases in
which the rule fails to accord with congressional intent. Cf. Eskridge & Frickey, supra
note 241, at 636-40 (discussing the claim that the Rehnquist Court's use of interpretive
principles is countermajoritarian); Scalia, supra note 93, at 29 (expressing skepticism about
the legitimacy of the Court's use of interpretive principles to make it more difficult for
Congress to achieve certain results).
303. See Braun, supra note 296, at 1000-02.
304. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text (suggesting that Congress would
not have wanted to leave the issue of pricing authority to the FCC's discretion).
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Note now outlines a policy-based interpretive argument that may
have influenced the AT&T majority, and concludes on the basis of
this argument that the Court reached the correct result in the case
even though its stated reasoning appears inconsistent with the
statutory text30 5
Although Justice Scalia has argued that courts should not
interpret statutes in the light of public policy assumptions,316 even
avowed textualists find it difficult to avoid making assumptions about
the policy preferences of Congress when they interpret statutes. In
AT&T, for instance, the majority rejected Justice Thomas's claim that
the 1996 Act gave the FCC jurisdiction only over those subsections of
47 U.S.C. § 251 that explicitly mention the Commission partly on the
ground that it was "most unlikely that Congress created such a
strange hodgepodge."307 In other words, the Court was reluctant to
accept Justice Thomas's interpretation when it could not imagine any
policy reasons why Congress would have created the jurisdictional
scheme he proposed. The Court has sometimes gone further,
justifying statutory interpretations on the ground that Congress would
not have made an unorthodox policy choice without debating that
choice and expressing it in clear statutory language. One such
example is the Court's invocation of the "silent dogs '308 principle of
statutory interpretation in Chisom v. Roemer.3? 9 In that case, the
Court held that the word "representatives" in an amendment to the
Voting Rights Act of 1965310 must be read to include judges,
reasoning that a decision to treat the election of judges differently
305. Additional policy reasons support the majority's result, but they are reasons that
courts often do not acknowledge explicitly. For example, some commentators have
expressed a preference for FCC jurisdiction on the theory that state utility commissions
have been "captured" by the ILECs and, hence, would be less likely than the FCC to
promote robust competition. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 92, at 91-92 (stating that federal
telecommunications policy historically has favored competition while state regulators have
preferred local monopolies); Weiser, supra note 38, at 36 (suggesting that arguments
against state autonomy under the 1996 Act reflect a "concern that state agencies are more
vulnerable to capture than federal ones").
306. See Scalia, supra note 93, at 20 ("Congress can enact foolish statutes as well as
wise ones, and it is not for the courts to decide which is which and rewrite the former.").
307. AT&T, 525 U.S. at 382 n. 8.
308. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 & n. 23 (1991) (citing Harrison v. PPG
Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 602 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). The Court alluded to a
Sherlock Holmes story in which the decisive clue was a watchdog's failure to bark in the
night. See id.; ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK
HOLMES 383, 400 (1930); see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 144, at 220-21, 325 (discussing
the "dog did not bark" canon).
309. 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
310. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, sec. 3, §2(b), 96 Stat.
131,134 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994)).
2000] 1699
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
from the election of legislators would have been so remarkable that
one would have expected Congress to comment on it?"' Because the
congressional "dog" did not bark, the Court effectively concluded
that the statutory language should be read to produce a result in
accordance with the Court's own expectations about the policy
preferences of Congress.3  Although Justice Scalia vigorously
rejected the Chisom Court's reasoning, 13 an analogous "silent dogs"
argument may be at work in the majority's resolution of the pricing
jurisdiction issue in AT&T.
The majority repeatedly voiced its incredulity toward the idea
that Congress meant for the state commissions to implement a federal
program by developing their own pricing schemes without any
guidance from the FCC. In response to Justice Thomas's observation
that no constitutional problems were posed by requiring the states to
implement and interpret federal law, the Court stated that it was
"aware of no similar instances in which federal policymaking has been
turned over to state administrative agencies." 314 The Court further
characterized the dissenters' interpretation of the 1996 Act as
creating a "decidedly novel" scheme in which Congress would expand
the scope of federal telecommunications law to include intrastate
communications, "but in a few specified areas (ratemaking,
interconnection agreements, etc.) [would leave] the policy
implications of that extension to be determined by state commissions,
which-within the broad range of lawful policymaking left open to
administrative agencies-are beyond federal control. 315
In a similar fashion, the majority responded to Justice Breyer's
appeal to the Rice presumption against federal preemption of state
police power regulations by observing that the crucial question in
AT&T was "whether the state commissions' participation in the
311. See Chisom, 501 U.S. at 404.
312. See id. at 396, 403-04; cf. Harrison, 446 U.S. at 602 (Relmquist, J., dissenting) ("In
a case where the construction of legislative language such as this makes so sweeping and
so relatively unorthodox a change as that made here, I think judges as well as detectives
may take into consideration the fact that a watchdog did not bark in the night.").
313. See Chisom, 501 U.S. at 405 (Scalia, 3., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for
beginning its interpretation "not with what the statute says, but with an expectation about
what the statute must mean absent particular phenomena"). Nevertheless, Justice Scalia
has elsewhere suggested that even in "normal, no-thumb-on-the-scales interpretation,"
courts might legitimately expect that "extraordinary" congressional decisions such as those
limiting the sovereign immunity of states should be "explicitly decreed rather than
offhandedly implied." Scalia, supra note 93, at 29.
314. AT&T, 525 U.S. at 385 n.10; but cf. Weiser, supra note 38, at 22-39 (arguing that
federal courts should defer to state agency interpretations of federal law).
315. AT&T, 525 U.S. at 385 n.10.
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administration of the new federal regime is to be guided by federal-
agency regulations. If there is any' "presumption"' applicable to this
question, it should arise from the fact that a federal program
administered by fifty independent state agencies is surpassing
strange. " 3
16
These reactions to the views of Justices Thomas and Breyer
suggest that the majority may have been influenced by a simple
"silent dogs" argument: (1) The "silent dogs" principle suggests that
if Congress wants to do something unusual or extraordinary, it will
clearly signal that desire. (2) The dissenters' interpretation of the
1996 Act would produce a regulatory scheme both "decidedly novel"
and "surpassing strange," so it follows from the "silent dogs"
principle that if Congress had intended to give the states pricing
authority under the Act, it would have signaled that desire in
unmistakable terms. (3) Because Congress failed to "bark" loudly in
§§ 251 and 252 of the Act, those sections should be read to grant
pricing jurisdiction to the FCC.
The plausibility of this argument depends largely on whether one
accepts the premise that it would have been unusual and
extraordinary for Congress to preserve state pricing autonomy within
a federal regulatory scheme. This Note argues that such a step would
have been extraordinary because it would either require the federal
courts to engage in extensive judicial policy making or to sacrifice the
uniformity of federal law. To understand why the dissenters'
approach would pose this choice, one must first appreciate that the
pricing standards set forth in § 252(d)(1) confer a great deal of
discretion on the policymaker.317 Under the majority's approach, that
discretion is conferred upon the FCC, which promulgates a general
pricing methodology to be administered by the states. Although the
state commissions set different prices based on local assessments of
cost, the meaning of the federal requirement that rates be just,
reasonable, nondiscriminatory, and cost-based will be essentially the
same in all fifty states. Under the dissenters' approach, however, the
discretion to set prices within the range consistent with the Act's
pricing standards falls primarily on state utility commissions. They
might adopt different approaches to pricing, and hence the federal
pricing requirements potentially could have a different meaning in
316. Id- at 379 n.6 (quoting id. at 420 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)).
317. See id. at 423 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that
the Act's pricing standards have given agencies "broad methodological leeway"); supra
note 49 (providing the text of § 252(d)(1)).
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each of the fifty states.
As Justice Scalia remarked, such a result would be "surpassing
strange"3 ' because it would conflict with a policy so deeply rooted in
the Court's practice that it rarely needs to be articulated-the policy
in favor of uniform application of federal laws. The policy dates back
to Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,319 in which Justice Story announced that
the Supreme Court had the authority to review state interpretations
of federal law and justified that principle partly on the ground that
without uniform state interpretations of federal law, no end of "public
mischiefs" would result.320 Although in recent years Justices have
been more frank in acknowledging that complete uniformity of
interpretation is unattainable, 321 the uniformity of federal law remains
an important policy goal3' and arguably an interpretive
presumption. 3
The only way to grant pricing authority to the states without
sacrificing the uniformity of federal law would be through aggressive
use of the federal district courts' authority to review state commission
arbitration proceedings. 24 Theoretically, the federal courts could
impose a uniform pricing standard on all the states,325 but such an
318. AT&T, 525 U.S. at 379 n.6.
319. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304,347-48 (1816).
320. Id. at 348.
321. See Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804,826 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (conceding that complete uniformity in the interpretation of federal law has
not been attained).
322. See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 43 (1989)
("[F]ederal statutes are generally intended to have uniform nationwide application.").
The proposed "silent dogs" argument might be subject to attack on the ground that
uniform application of federal law is an overrated policy value. Cf. Weiser, supra note 38,
at 40-44 (extolling the virtues of non-uniformity). Yet, even if allowing considerable
variation in the state administration of federal programs can be desirable, such a
regulatory scheme is unusual enough that Congress might be expected to signal clearly its
desire to allow the states to apply federal law in a non-uniform manner.
323. Note, however, that at least one commentator has cautioned that the uniformity of
federal law should not be considered as more than an interpretive presumption. See Akhil
Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal
Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205,220 n.59 (1985) ("It is not at all clear that uniformity is a
value inherent in the constitutional structure.").
324. See 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6) (Supp. III 1997).
325. Courts uniformly have employed de novo review in deciding whether state utility
commissions have interpreted the 1996 Act properly. See, e.g., GTE S., Inc. v. Morrison,
199 F.3d 733, 745 (4th Cir. 1999) (determining that de novo review is necessary because
state agencies deserve less deference than do federal agencies when they interpret federal
law); AT&T Communications of the S. Cent. States, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 20
F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1100 (E.D. Ky. 1998) (stating that "it is not appropriate to defer to [sic]
state agency's interpretations of federal law"); AT&T Communications of Cal., Inc. v.
Pacific Bell, No. C 97-0080 SI, 1998 WL 246652, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1998) (adopting
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attempt would entangle the courts in just the sort of policy judgments
that are more appropriately left to politically accountable executive
agencies.? 6 The choice for the federal courts under the dissenters'
reading of the Act would amount to this: they would either have to
defer to state commission judgments-thus sacrificing the uniformity
of federal law-or to take on policymaking functions more properly
left to executive agencies. The majority was unwilling to read the Act
as imposing such a choice on the federal judiciary-and quite
properly so. Congress could, of course, decide to sacrifice either the
uniformity of federal law or the practice of leaving policy decisions to
executive agencies. But one would expect Congress to discuss such a
decision at length and to signal it clearly; Congress did neither in the
1996 Act. Thus, whether or not the "silent dogs" argument actually
influenced the majority, it provides strong support for the Court's
decision to uphold the FCC's pricing jurisdiction.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court's decision in AT&T is correct
in recognizing broad FCC jurisdiction over all aspects of § 251, but
the Court's attempt to resolve the pricing jurisdiction issue by appeal
to the plain meani ng of the text is unsatisfying. Both the legislative
history and the text of the 1996 Act are systematically ambiguous.
Indeed, they may even suggest that Congress did not simply fail to
address the issue of pricing jurisdiction, but intentionally avoided a
clear decision on that issue?" The Court's appeal to plain meaning
suppresses these ambiguities, thereby providing another example of
the Rehnquist Court's penchant for pulling the rabbit of plain
meaning from the hat of statutory ambiguity.3'
Such interpretive sleight of hand raises troubling questions,
especially in cases such as AT&T in which Congress may have chosen
ambiguous language in order to cede a difficult policy choice to the
courts. If the plain meaning of statutory text does not reflect any
congressional policy choice, close textualist readings that refuse to
consider policy considerations can produce wise decisions only by
de novo review for questions of federal law under the 1996 Act), aff'd, 203 F.3d 1183 (9th
Cir. 2000); U.S. W. Communications, Inc. v. Hix, 986 F. Supp. 13, 17-18 (D. Colo. 1997)
(stating that state agencies' interpretations should not be granted the same degree of
deference as federal agencies' interpretations).
326. Cf. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
865-66 (1984) ("[F]ederal judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to respect
legitimate policy choices made by those who do.").
327. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (suggesting that the 1996 Act's
treatment of pricing authority may be intentionally ambiguous).
328. Professor Merrill has observed that the internal dynamics of the Rehnquist Court
create disincentives for finding statutes ambiguous. See Merrill, supra note 205, at 370-71.
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happenstance.329 Furthermore, rigorous textual analysis of ambiguous
statutes is unlikely to produce predictable decisions or to minimize
judicial discretion.3  Indeed, analysis of the texts at issue in AT&T
strongly suggests that the Court could have used "plain meaning"
arguments to support either the FCC or the state commissions. These
problems raise an even more fundamental question about why courts
should be bound by statutory text that cannot be said to reflect the
policy choices of elected representatives. 31
In the face of these problems, choosing to decide cases solely on
textualist grounds might be justified if, as Justice Scalia contends,
textualist interpretation eventually will lead Congress to draft statutes
more responsibly.332 One may doubt, however, whether courts should
be willing to disregard policy considerations completely in the hopes
of improving congressional behavior. Apparently, the AT&T
majority was not willing to do so. Although the Court claimed to
articulate the plain meaning of the 1996 Act, its decision on the
pricing jurisdiction issue is better supported by the "silent dogs"
argument than by textual analysis. Perhaps the Court was
inconsistent in failing to keep policy assumptions completely out of its
analysis, but such inconsistency should be welcomed when there is
reason to believe that Congress has intentionally left an important
policy decision in judicial hands. In such circumstances, it is better to
have the judiciary consider policy issues than to have no policy
deliberations at all.
JOHN E. TAYLOR
329. Cf Merrill, supra note 60, at 1002 (noting a concern that, by deciding interpretive
questions at the plain meaning level, courts will dictate policy "without any consideration
of the substantive values at issue in the policy disputes-either those that animated
Congress or those articulated by the agency charged with administration of the statute").
330. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 144, at 42-47 (arguing that Justice Scalia's textualism
does not yield determinate results in hard cases and does no more to constrain judicial
discretion than other interpretive theories).
331. Cf. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 235 (2000) (suggesting that textualism may lack a plausible theory of
political authority and threatens to "sever the connection between democracy and the rule
of law in ways that we should find alarming"); Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88
MICH. L. REV. 104, 111-12 (1989) (arguing that a statute's power to constrain stems from
"the fact that [its] words express a specific collective decision made by the designated
political authority").
332. See United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 345-46 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part) (stating that statutory interpretation should "foster] th[e] democratic process" by
stimulating Congress to draft statutes with more exactitude). But see Eskridge, supra note
204, at 677 (expressing doubt that even the wholehearted judicial embrace of textualism
would greatly affect Congress's approach to drafting statutes).
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